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I. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS IN THE REGION 
1. Evolution and different situations 
Different analytical paradigms have attempted to explain the 
development process of social security systems in Latin America. 
In characterizing and classifying these processes, prerogative 
has been given to legal, socio-political and administrative-
organizational analyses. Methodologically, inputs and outputs 
are defined which are assumed to be exterior manifestations of 
the degree of development of the social security systems in the 
different countries (risks covered, extension of coverage, sen-
i o r i t y of legislation, method of financing, etc). The search for 
common denominators and the defining of chronological stages in 
this process i s the expositive result of this type of analysis. 
(ILO, International Labour Organization, 1967). 
This idea of development of social security systems in 
stages assumes that the systems have their own dynamics, which 
allows one to identify degrees of maturity. In Latin America, 
the motor behind such dynamics appears to be the dialectics 
between different pressure groups (identified primarily as prof-
essional corporations) and the State, as institutional counter-
part and intermediary in the resolution of social conflicts (Mesa 
Lago, 1978). The distinctiveness of each country derives from 
the individual charateristics which the dialectics assumes in 
them. 
In distinguishing degrees of maturity in social security 
systems, a wellknown ECLAC study ranks the countries of Latin 
America into three groups (high, intermediate and low) according 
to values given to a selected group of variables, at the begin-
ning of the eighties (Mesa Lago, 1985). In the "high" group are 
found Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Chile and Costa Rica; in 
the "intermediate" group are, Panama, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Venezuela; and in the "low" 
group, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Honduras and Haiti (table 1) . The study referred to does not 
take into account non-Latin Caribbean countries, because the 
development of social security systems in these has been substan-
t i a l l y different and i t would complicate comparisons proposed in 
the study. 
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This classification overlaps with another which orders the 
countries according to the time of nascence of their social 
security system institutions. Based on this, a double entry 
table combining both classifications could be devised (Table 1). 
In this way, the high group countries would coincide with the 
pioneers in establishing social security institutions in the 
region, and their salient characteristic would be institutional 
fragmentation of the system. Costa Rica, despite i t s lateness in 
organizing i t s system, by the beginning of the eighties had 
achieved levels in indicators selected, similar to the high 
group. Countries included in the intermediate group organized 
their institutions from the forties onward and in a more unified 
manner. Countries of the low group are those in which social 
security systems only appeared in the f i f t i e s and sixties, with 
more formally unified systems. 
For the purposes of comparing indicators, the study conti-
nues to be relevant because the indicators have not undergone 
major changes from the time of i t s writing, at least in those 
aspects which determine their ordering. In fact, in some cases, 
a certain regression has been observed in indicators, as a log-
i c a l outcome of the economic c r i s i s which affected the region 
during this decade. 
In addition to being pioneers with regard to the estab-
lishment of institutions typical to social security, the follow-
ing elements were common to the "high" group countries: coverage 
exceeded 60% of total and working population, covering the rest 
with assistance benefits; taxation on money wages exceeded 26%; 
system expenditure as a whole neared or exceeded 10% of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), with approximately half of i t going to 
the pensions programme, for which reason the system experienced 
serious financial imbalances; the method of financing in force, 
at least in fact, was one of distribution; the ratio of passives 
to working population was very high, reaching 0.6 to 1; and l i f e 
expectancy was high, while the population growth rate was low. 
Countries in the intermediate group had lower coverage and 
a broader range (between 18% and 50%); taxation on money wage 
was lower (around 20%); social security expenditure averaged 3% 
of GDP, with the majority of i t going to the health programme; 
the system for finp.ncing pensions programmes involved stepped 
mean premiums or distribution of coverage capital; the ratio of 
passives to working population varied from 0.05 to 0.15; l i f e 
expectancy was lower and population growth rate was higher. 
In the case of countries ranked in the low group, population 
coverage was very limited (less than 10% of total population and 
19% of working population) and i t was concentrated in the capital 
and other major c i t i e s ; social security expenditure did not 
exceed 2% of GDP and the greater part of i t went to sick and 
maternity programmes (less than one f i f t h went to the pensions 
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prográanne); the passives/working ratio was extremely low (bet-
ween 0.02 and 0.08); l i f e expectancy was low and population 
growth rate extremely high. 
The study estimated an average of approximately 61% for both 
total population health coverage and working population pensions, 
for Latin America as a whole. Nevertheless these figures were 
heavily influenced by Brazil, since when this country was exc-
luded the percentage dropped to 42.7% (table 2). In the majority 
of countries, the percentage of working population covered by 
social security i s similar to that corresponding to the foinmal-
urban sector. Although there are no recent comprehensive stud-
ies, partial data from various countries allow one to suppose 
that coverage has shrunk in recent years, particularly in the 
pensions programme. The increase in unemployment, the drop in 
real wages and the increase in the informal working sector, among 
other factors to which the functioning of the social security 
system i s sensitive, justify this observation. 
By 1982, both health and pensions programmes, together with 
that for occupational hazards, were institutionalized in the 20 
countries considered in the study cited. On the other hand, 
family allowance and unemployment programmes existed only in 
seven and five countries respectively. In general, risk 
coverage in Latin America has expanded in the sense of offering 
more services to the same people, rather than expanding coverage, 
thus generating serious problems of fragmentation and inequity. 
Evolution-based paradigms, with their emphasis on legal-
institutional matters and financial balances, have given prerog-
ative to analysis of the internal dynamics of social security 
systems, disregarding to a certain extent the conditioning 
factors of i t s reference framework. This i s in part a result of 
the demonstration effect deriving from recommendations by inter-
national agencies and from the experience of more developed 
countries. 
The distinctive features of the systems' internal operat-
tional logic are heavily permeated by the particular formation of 
the state in each type of society, by the specific characteris-
t i c s of social conflict which public policies attempt to manage 
in each country and the ties between them, by the predominant 
p o l i t i c a l and economic ideology at a given moment and by the 
real i t y construct which arises out of the same. To this are 
added matters which make for the specific functioning of the 
economic system and i t s interrelation with social security polic-
ies. The lack of debate on these issues has favoured the adopt-
ion of models supposedly in force universally, which in some 
cases have been proven inopérant in the region. 
Part of the explanation of this situation should be sought 
in the simple fact that in many countries and for a long time 
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debate was suppressed or delimited b y the dictatorial regimes in 
force. Paradoxically, during the period these regimes were in 
force, in the sixties and seventies, structural modifications of 
the social security system were attempted, primarily in those 
countries considered to be pioneers. In Brazil the entire system 
was practically unified, in Argentina and Uruguay an agency was 
created to integrate or coordinate existing institutions and in 
Chile reform was initiated which seeks to eliminate the public 
system (conserving assistancial actions), thus creating, with 
help from the State, conditions for the emergence of a private 
system of insurance and health services. 
To a certain extent, the experience of the region presents 
various alternatives. While inertia i s confirmed in the evolut-
ion of social security systems of some countries, in others there 
i s serious bankruptcy, more as a result of regulatory policies 
on the part of the State than by gains of workers acting en 
masse. When i t is suggested that the motor behind development of 
the system has been the action of pressure groups, one has to 
read corporate interest groups negotiating separately with the 
State, rather than the collective actions of a specific social 
class. 
Each pressure group's space i s greatly modified not only by 
economic and social transformations, but also by institutional 
bankruptcies. This explains, in part, the fragmentation typical 
of the systems in the region. It also helps one to understand 
the widespread privileged situation of groups labourally depen-
dent on the State, which did not change substantially under the 
various p o l i t i c a l regimes in force. State bureaucracy has always 
been a stable power group in the region, and i t s loyalty has been 
greatly linked to the perquisites and privileges obtained from 
the social security system. 
In this study we especially focus on those examples which 
il l u s t r a t e various situations of the region. In one case, we 
have Argentina, where the military dictatorship exhausted reform 
under the formality of unifying the system's institutions, but 
without modifying i t s operational logic. When, at the beginning 
of the eighties, the economic c r i s i s deepened, the democratic 
government was faced with a depleted system, chronically in 
de f i c i t , which affected i t s own p o l i t i c a l legitimacy. In the 
case of pensions, in fact, initiatives have begun where comp-
lementary insurance i s offered at the private sector's expense, 
tied to major financial entities. But, up to now, this has been 
an isolated attempt to attract demand unsatisfied by the public 
system - uncoordinated and without prior debate. 
Another case is that of Chile. Here bankrupting occurred 
which bore no relation to the supposed evolutionary stages of 
social security systems. The Chilean experience clearly shows 
that the dynamics of an institution does not depend exclusively 
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on i t s endogenous variables, but also on the environment which 
serves as i t s reference. The boost given to the private sector 
in capturing the social services market was unprecedented in the 
region. The financial and p o l i t i c a l assistance given by the 
authoritarian State leaves doubts as to the new system's 
autonomous capacity for development. In any event, i t i s unclear 
whether this represents a regression to old social security 
systems based on individual responsibility (in a p o l i t i c a l 
setting similar to a Bismarkian one), or w i l l become an 
alternative for other countries of the region. 
Costa Rica i s presented here as an example of a country 
which jumped certain stages and which, under special p o l i t i c a l 
conditions, including a constitutional amendment in 1961, was 
surprising in i t s accelerated evolution of indicators over the 
last three decades. The motor behind the development of Costa 
Rica's social security system has been p o l i t i c a l consensus, which 
has allowed for innovative institutions to arise, as in the case 
of non-taxable pensions for basic amounts. At the same time, the 
experience of the current decade clearly shows the objective 
constraints imposed by the economic context, even in places where 
no major p o l i t i c a l contradictions are manifest. 
Ecuador i s another distihctive case where what is most 
interesting i s the recent development of peasant social security, 
in an attempt to overcome constraints placed by the urban formal 
sector. Also observed are the serious problems of savings accum-
ulation in a relatively undeveloped pensions programme, when the 
capital market i s small and the financial c r i s i s acute. 
2. Social security systems and economic c r i s i s ; 
the search for a new paradigm 
The evolution of social security systems in the eighties clearly 
shows how economic concerns have dominated centre stage. This 
aspect had been underrated to a certain extent by students of the 
subject, probably because social security development in pioneer 
countries coincided with a stage of r e l a t i v e economic 
prosperity, or at least, with less sharp cyc l i c a l swings in the 
economy. Nevertheless, the economic c r i s i s which the region i s 
experiencing has caused economic discourse to prevail over legal-
p o l i t i c a l and even that i t confront the latter. To a certain 
extent, i t can be said that social security in the region has 
been l e f t without a paradigm and this makes i t s immediate future 
more indeterminate. 
The social security c r i s i s in the region goes hand in hand 
with the c r i s i s in economic paradigm which boosted i t s develop-
ment. The view which Keynes popularized with regard to the 
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fvmctioning of the economic system claimed effective demand as 
the system's motor and guarantor of i t s sttóility. in practice, 
the consequence was that a l l "consumption stabilizers" turn func-
tional for a policy which attempts to maintain income and employ-
ment levels. If current consvunption and investment determined 
income, this meant that current expenditure, and not savings, 
would determine future expenditure. In this way, proposals for 
the accumulation of large masses of capital, as required by the 
capitalization systems of pensions programmes, lost a l l sustenan-
ce. 
Social security systems were structured along two key lines 
of Keynesian policy: f i s c a l and labour market. Precisely these 
two areas were particularly affected by the economic c r i s i s of 
the eighties and explain in part the severity with which limits 
to the systems' expansion have been manifested. The other 
aspect of the link between Keynesian policies and social security 
systems of the region, which i t is important to highlight, has to 
do with an assumption or prerequisite of the conceptual paradigm: 
the existence of available capital to reply to demand pressure, 
which, among other things, conditions the inflationary or recov-
ery impact of the f i s c a l d e f i c i t . The disinvestment process, the 
net f l i g h t of capital from 1982 onward as a result of the exter-
nal debt and the cutting <ff international credits, the f a l l in 
price of internationally traded products, the concentration of 
li q u i d capital in large entrepreneurial groups, have a l l deepened 
the process of decapitalization and lack of liquidity of the 
region's economies. 
The traditional practice of analyzing the social security 
system as an isolated system, with specific inputs and outputs, 
may hide certain essential issues which make for the very constr-
uct of the model of analysis. In formalizing the Latin American 
social security model, not only has the exogenous become endogen-
ous, but also variables have become parameters and vice versa. 
The formalized wage relationship has been the axis along 
which social security institutions in Latin America have been 
constructed, and for this reason is the main limitation to their 
expansion. Limits imposed by the labour market do not refer 
exclusively to employment levels, but are also related to i t s 
legal forms, i t s mobility, productivity level and the economic 
sector in which i t i s found. From the socio-political stand-
point, these characteristics define specific forms of relations 
between the corporate power of professional groups and the State, 
and have also conditioned the bureacratic organizational struc-
ture of both. To a certain extent, social security's exp l i c i t 
objective was lost. Instead of being an income distribution 
mechanism for citizens as a whole, i t became a mechanism for 
mediation between demands and the granting of perquisities. 
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For this reason, an i n i t i a l stage has traditionally been 
recognized in the countries of the region, in which only certain 
privileged sectors obtained benefits from the system, followed 
by a period of "massification" of these privileges. But this 
massification of privileges was not universal ( i f i t had been 
xiniversal they would no longer have been privileges) . For this 
reason too, equitable systems were not created, but rather 
institutions s t r a t i f i e d by privileges. It i s not surprising that 
State-dependent labour sectors were the f i r s t to receive coverage 
and are those which enjoy the best services. 
Use of the wage relationship as the system's axis has 
conditioned f i s c a l treatment. Money wage has traditionally been 
the taxable base on which taxes for financing the system are 
calculated. As a result, the wage-earning mass sets precise 
limits on financing. The increase in unemployment and informal 
a c t i v i t i e s of the eighties has crudely demonstrated the sensitiv-
i t y of this type of financial set-up. If to this we add declines 
in productivity, in real wages and in the State's power of 
fiscalization, we can better understand the considerable impact 
had by evasion on the part of both ensured and employer. This 
phenomenon is more evident in the case of self employed workers. 
Attempts to" incorporate them through typical insurance system 
benefit-compensation schemes (whether voluntary or imposed) have 
failed (primarily among the lowest income groups). 
In the case of pensions programmes, evasion or delays in 
receipt of funds or in compliance with legal regulations have 
increased the gap between the real and potential rate of support. 
In the case of health programmes, service has become fragmented, 
and where the market is sufficiently developed, a shift has 
occurred among higher income levels to the private sector. The 
result has been an increase in the demand placed on public infra-
structure to which is added the scarcity of resources. Even 
those with institutional coverage go on to use services destined 
for those not covered due to their in a b i l i t y to meet additional 
expenses required to effectively access the service. 
Identifying money wage as the source of financing for social 
security - a legacy from social security system schemes based on 
employer responsibility - has generated the idea that such prog-
rammes are self-financed and independent from the other f i s c a l 
policies. This has caused a lack of coordination between social 
security policies themselves and between these policies as a 
whole and the remainder of public policies. 
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3. Social Security and The Problem of Old Age; 
Pensions Prog£aasBes 
The speci f i c i t y of the time in one's l i f e cycle at which one may 
haye access to retirement benefit i s what links i t to the old 
age problem. But in reality, pensions programmes were not const-
ructed thinking of old age as a •• contingency", but rather viewing 
the issue of work retirement and labour market regulation as an 
objective of the system. For this reason, in nearly a l l coun-
tr i e s of the region (Mexico and Ecuador are some exceptions) the 
old age programme i s integrated with that of dis a b i l i t y and 
death. Within the complex issue which encompasses old age, 
social security sought to take care of loss of income through 
i n a b i l i t y (alleged or determined) to offer one's work in the 
labour market. 
A l l countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have ins-
tituted old age retirement programmes (information on groups 
covered, sources of financing, requirements for accessing benef-
i t s and characteristics of benefits granted, are presented in the 
Appendix). Retirement programmes existing in the region recog-
nize the right to old age benefits for the most part between age 
60 and 65. There are a few exceptions, but always involving 
lower retirement ages: in Bolivia 55 (men) and 50 (women), in 
Ecuador 55 with 360 months of contributions or any age with 420 
months of contributions and in Haiti age 55. 
In some countries, primarily the pioneers, the age limit is 
lower for women (Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Chile, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela). These differences are 
essentially based on the idea that the incorporation of women 
into the work force i s marginal and that women work mainly in the 
home. Since women's l i f e expectancy i s higher (from 45 onward, 
there are more women than men in Latin America and the Carib-
bean) , this has caused the receipt of double benefits by those 
women who receive their own pensions and simultaneously receive 
an annuity for surviving their insured spouses. 
Benefit levels granted by the pensions system are not deter-
mined on the basis of retiree needs, but rather are linked in one 
way or another to working income levels: wages, income scales, 
contributions are the bases for benefit calculation. In very few 
cases are benefits granted in a uniform amount (Mexico, Costa 
Rica). In some cases, pensions are complemented by family allow-
ances for wife, underage or disabled children (Argentina, Colom-
bia, Chile, E l Salvador, Guatemala. Mexico, the Dominican Repub-
l i c , Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay). 
The result i s a pensions system organized to reproduce for 
passives an income position similar that attained while working. 
Thus, in distributive terms, these systems are negative or 
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regressive. The proliferation of assistance programmes i s not to 
be wondered at, then, since these seek to meet the specific needs 
of senior citizens, whether or not they are covered by the social 
security system. But these programmes are seen as assistance 
policies and not as compensators by right. 
In defining pension programme assistance, the concept of 
labour "dependence" tends to be attached to the concept of 
"retirement". Thus, in the majority of countries a f f i l i a t i o n to 
the pensions programme i s not mandatory for self-employed or 
"independent" workers (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba and 
Uruguay are exceptions). In fact, whether a f f i l i a t i o n i s volun-
tary or mandatory, there are very few of these who incorporate 
themselves into the system, especially at lower income levels. 
In this way the State becomes receiver for the complex 
demands of the non-working population, whose practices are deter-
mined to a large extent by their activities during working l i f e . 
A relevant question posed regards the degree of individuality to 
which public policy can or should aspire. Thus, the pensions 
programme, in the majority of countries, seeks to guarantee a 
proportion of the working income of passives, whereby the same 
heterogeneities and fragmentation which characterize labour 
markets of the region are reproduced. The outcome is that, while 
for some groups a basic level of consumption cannot be main-
tained, for others even a savings capacity of beneficiaries is 
guaranteed. 
Special pension programmes for certain categories of profes-
sionals, primarily in the public sector, are common in the reg-
ion. Privileges may occur in the f l e x i b i l i t y of requirements 
for access to them or in benefits received. This generates a 
situation of i r r i t a t i v e inequality, above a l l i f one considers 
that the cost of these priveleges is passed on to the community 
as a whole, whether directly through taxation or indirectly 
through prices or t a r i f f s . 
Only in a few countries is retirement or pension granted for 
old age, in some cases without previous contribution and in 
others with minimum contribution (Argentina, Ecuador and Urug-
uay) . In other words, in only a few countries i s age - one of 
the indicators of the old age situation - a "reason" for retire-
ment. In general, age i s a "requirement" for accessing retire-
ment and those who are theoretically less old at a determined age 
(women) are those that have access to i t before. 
In Brazil and Ecuador, for example, there are pensions for 
years of service without age requirements. In practice, this 
type of benefit serves to protect those persons who lose their 
job at an advanced age and have serious d i f f i c u l t i e s in reenter-
ing the labour market. Theoretically, the legislation of certain 
countries has similar practical effects, where reduced or early 
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pensions are offered after a set number of contributions have 
been paid (Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvad-
or, Panama and Peru). 
In summary, retirement programmes cover only one aspect of 
old age: loss of the insured's source of income due to assumed 
physical d i s a b i l i t y or to obsolescence in the labour force. 
Retirement i s conceived as coverage for loss of productive social 
function. For this reason, in effect, i t i s an instrument for 
labour market regulation. This idea i s reinforced when one notes 
that, although in the majority of Latin American countries 
exercising the right to an old age pension i s optional, in some 
(Argentina, Brazil) the worker can be told to retire when he 
meets the stipulated requirements for access to maximum retire-
ment. In Honduras, retirement is mandatory once requirements 
have been met. 
The majority of countries in the region possess minimum 
pensions (usually at very low levels) and with adjustment 
mecanisms for easing deterioration of purchasing power due to 
inflation. Adjustment c r i t e r i a are varied; in some cases, 
according, to variations in wages (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Uruguay), in others as a function of cost of livi n g (Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, El Salvador), of the price index (Brazil, Chile, 
Nicaragua), according to a combination of prices and wages 
(Venezuela) or by l e g a l p r o v i s i o n (Mexico, Panama) . 
Nevertheless, in few cases have the legal provisions been met 
lately, due to the very effects of the f i s c a l c r i s i s and 
maturation of the systems. In any case, this issue encompasses 
another matter which has not been clearly defined either: 
retirement "mobility". This is not merely a technical issue, but 
i s greatly dependent on the very concept of retirement adopted. 
In terms of financing, in the majority of countries the old 
age pensions programme is financed by three sources: contrib-
utors, employers and the State (whether as employer, transferring 
a preset amount of resources or covering occasional deficits of 
the system). The final impact of this type of f i s c a l burden is a 
subject for debate, but i t seems logical to assert that given 
oligopólio markets, characteristic of the region, and the per-
sistent f i s c a l d e f i c i t , a great portion of the burden i s passed 
on to prices. More debatable i s the potential effect in the 
selection of production techniques. In many cases there are 
maximum contribution ceilings, which not only reduce the sys-
tems' s financing capacity, but which also generate distortions in 
income distribution. 
Another matter concerns the method of financing. The fact 
that one particular method is in force i s not the outcome of 
technical considerations, but rather results primarily from the 
economic situation and the system's degree of maturity. In a 
survey carried out on the topic, the majority of countries ans-
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wered that the main cause of change in their methods of financing 
was the system's economic situation (Brenes, 1986). It i s neces-
sary to bear in mind that, at the time of their constitution, and 
independently of the financing mechanism, i t is logical to sup-
pose that a l l pensions systems must function with a high rate of 
support. Thus, they are a l l systems which are potentially 
capable of accumulating reserves. The difference l i e s in that a 
capitalization system requires maintenance of a technical reserve 
in order to exist, while those based on distribution can dispense 
with them. 
In the beginning, nearly a l l countries used a regime of pure 
capitalization or stepped premiums. But the need to adopt a 
distribution method due to pressing economic needs, has not 
allowed legislation to adapt to the new reality. As a result, 
there are countries, mainly the pioneers, which evince an ins-
titutional hybrid: legal standards conceived in terms of a 
capitalization method with respect to the rights which i t grants 
individuals, while the system is financed as a distributive one. 
The distinctiveness of the pensions programmes, analyzed 
within the context of old age policies, is that they grant benef-
i t s in money which are not linked to the capital equity position 
of the beneficiary. The rest of the policies offer assistance in 
kind, or, i f in money, i t is related to a specific end use. This 
difference in logic is what makes i t d i f f i c u l t to coordinate the 
whole. 
The most important assistance in kind i s that of health 
service. In the majority of the region's countries, pensioners 
are incorporated into the working population is health programme. 
Argentina i s an interesting case where an attempt was made to 
institutionalize a special programme for retirees, within the 
general logic of the health system in force. 
This situation i s i l l u s t r a t i v e when i t comes time to propose 
structural reforms. The increase in number of senior citizens, 
the majority of which depend on public assistance for meeting 
their basic needs, may be a fundamental element in confronting a 
modification of the costly and inefficient health systems of the 
region. 
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II. SOME ILLUSTRATIVE CASES 
1- Argentina; The Inertia of a Depleted Svstem 
As of the mid sixties the Argentine social security system began 
to manifest problems typical to pioneer countries and mature 
systems. Nevertheless, reform attempts which were progressively 
undertaken at no time substantially altered their operating 
logic. The eighties saw an acceleration of the c r i s i s of the 
system and the democratic government was forced to declare a 
social security emergency. This not only affected i t s legitimacy 
but also c l e a r l y demonstrated the latent conflicts and 
contradictions which exist between a r i g i d legal set-up and a 
dynamic political-economic reality. 
In order to adequately interpret the current social security 
situation in Argentina, one must remember certain issues central 
to the constituting process and development of i t s institutions. 
The f i r s t laws basically applied to pensions programmes and the 
f i r s t groups covered were those linked to public services. 
Nevertheless, towards 1944 those a f f i l i a t e d to the various Funds 
only accounted for 7% of the working population. 
In 1946 the stage of pension programme massification began, 
as did the start of social security in the area of medical atten-
tion. The massive incorporation of new contributors occurred 
simultaneously with legislation which was generous in i t s requir-
ements for accessing the systems's benefits (table 3 shows the 
high growth rates of benefits in the f i f t i e s ) . In the area of 
health, support was given to the creation of "social works" 
(union social security plans), successors of mutual associations. 
The f i r s t to arise were linked with state unions and that part of 
the private sector with greatest economic power, which allowed 
them to create their own medical attention establishments and to 
offer a f f i l i a t e s a direct attention modality. For unions with 
l e s s e r power, " i n d i r e c t " a t t e n t i o n was developed. 
Simultaneously, in t h i s era, government promoted major 
development of public hospital infrastructure. 
During the f i r s t years of establishment of the new pensions 
plan, the various Funds had sizeable surpluses which were used to 
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finance other social policies. At the end of the f i f t i e s this 
surplus had a l l but disappeared yet; paradoxically, in 1958, a 
new law was enacted which established the obligation to pay up to 
82% of the wages that had been received by pension beneficiaries 
in their f i n a l working stage, depending on retirement age. Thus, 
the system began to function, in effect, as a distributive one, 
and, concurrently, i t institutionalized the severing of links 
between wage calculation and revenue. As a result, from the mid 
sixties onward, the system as a whole began to show systemic 
financial deficits (Dieguez y Petrecola, 1974). 
Faced with this situation the military dictatorship which 
took p o l i t i c a l power in 1966 decided to implement a reform on 
which the current system i s based. The State Secretary's Office 
for Social Security was created within the Ministry of Labour to 
regulate and supervise the system, the various Funds were merged 
into three (Commerce and Industry, State and Autonomous) and age 
requirements for accessing benefits were raised. Nevertheless, 
this attempt to establish a more uniform system was reverted by 
events. Within the very ambit of the State, a short time later, 
special regimes were authorized for o f f i c i a l s of the Judicial 
Branch, the Presidency of the Nation and the Federal Police. 
Simultaneously, complementary Funds for different occupational 
groups became increasingly widespread. 
In 1970, at a time when the military dictatorship was grow-
ing p o l i t i c a l l y weaker, the Law of Social Works was approved for 
the purpose of disencumbering the financial problems of an impor-
tant group of social works and ordering i t s operation. To this 
end the National Institute of Social Works, (I.N.O.S.) was creat-
ed, which agency was given the task of coordinating and planning 
social works activities as a whole, in addition to controlling 
their resources, financing and investment. In this way, the 
social works subsystem was institutionalized, which, together 
with those of the private and public sector, from thereon formed 
the tripod on which Argentina's health system is structured. The 
original aspect of this scheme involved legally setting a minimum 
base for contributions calculated on money wage, from which 
resources were extracted, and passed over into the hands of union 
representatives, to whom the task of administering social works 
was given. 
In May 1971 a special social work was created for benefic-
iaries of the social security system: the National Social Ser-
vices Instittite for Retirees and Pensioners (I.N.S.S.J.P.). To 
meet i t s objectives, the establishing of a medical attention 
system throughout the entire country was proposed, which was 
called the Integral Medical Assistance Programme (P.A.M.I.). 
The programme was structured into different levels of medical 
attention. A f i r s t level was organized around a general "head" 
doctor, who was responsible for a limited group of beneficiaries 
who chose him from a l i s t made up by the Institute. The second 
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level of attention was made up of specialized cross-consultation 
services requested by the head doctor and services for scheduled 
or emergency hospitilization of acutely i l l patients, in addition 
to highly complex diagnostic or therapeutic treatments. The 
third level was reserved for beneficiaries who suffered from 
prolonged a f f l i c t i o n s of any sort. 
The payment modality of PAMI substantially modified two key 
practices prevailing up to that time and which were defended by 
medical corporations: free choice of doctor and payment by 
benefit. In PAMI, the head doctor received a fixed amount per 
beneficiary and for a set amount of time. An overall capital 
amount was estimated for those providing assistance at the second 
level, while those of the third level charged per medical service 
rendered. 
Active resistance by the medical corporation resulted in 
PAMI's only being able to be developed in the Federal Capital and 
i t s conurbation. The loss of p o l i t i c a l support for the programme 
caused INSSJP policy to center on entering into comprehensive 
agreements with medical federations, social works associations 
or municipalities. In these cases the Institute acted only as 
collecting agent, transferring what was stipulated in agreements 
to contracted parts. In 1986, 43% of those a f f i l i a t e d to INSSJP 
were covered by the PAMI system, 32.3% by comprehensive contracts 
and the remainder by mixed systems, arising out of a combination 
of the f i r s t two (Colbert, 1988). 
The pensions system structure has not undergone any modific-
ations since the reform of 1967, and since that time, p o l i t i c a l 
power has faced serious d i f f i c u l t i e s in meeting what was stip-
ulated by legislation. The process of deterioration has deepend 
in the last years (see table 4). In 1980, the government of the 
new military dictatorship, initiated in 1976, eliminated employer 
contribution to the pensions programme, supplanting i t with a 
transfer of funds collected through value added tax (VAT). This 
transfer was calculated on the basis of collections carried out 
through personal contributions to the system, with which the 
overall amount of resources would theoretically not suffer modif-
ications, with reform being limited to a supposed attempt to 
reduce labour costs and favour competition, within the framework 
of a p o l i t i c a l economy of indiscriminate aperture and lagging of 
exchange rate. 
The isolated and irrational nature of this situation became 
manifest when in 1984 the constitutional government had to rein-
troduce employer contributions in the face of the system's pres-
sing financial needs. The systematic deterioration of the finan-
c i a l system in 1985 became translated into Law 23270, which 
establishes the transfer of 25% of total collections undertaken 
by Family Allowance Programme, over to the social security 
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system, thus reducing the amount of former programmes' benefits. 
In 1986 employer contributions were raised to 12.5%. 
The financial flows were insufficient for meeting legally 
established obligations and so began a generalized process of 
lawsuits f i l e d by beneficiaries of the system. This situation 
led government to decree the "social security state of emergen-
cy", establishing the stoppage of a l l existing lawsuits up to 
that moment and impeding the f i l i n g of new suits unti l 1988. 
The p o l i t i c a l delegitimization produced by this measure is 
often cited as one of the causes of the o f f i c i a l electoral defeat 
in parliamentary and governor elections held in late 1987. In 
light of this, in May 1988 the Executive Power decreed a revoking 
of the social security emergency, a return to the ordinary regime 
for pensions calculation, as provided for by law 18037 of 1967, a 
modification of contribution percentages, a raising of pension 
ceilings with regard to minimum retirement and the establishing 
of a new regime for judgement executions by readjustment of 
u n f u l f i l l e d social security benefits as provided for by law. 
Simultaneously, a special tax was levied on fuel prices and on 
certain public service rates to finance recomposition of the 
value of social security benefits, i t being estimated at the time 
of implementation, that the additional contribution would be 2% 
of GDP. Thus the systems's inability to finance i t s e l f through 
taxes which i t has classically collected was explicitly exposed. 
In health, the military dictatorship in power during 1976-
1983 approved a new Social Works Law which attempted to curtail 
union power by eliminating them from i t s administration and which 
promoted the idea of free choice of social security scheme by 
citizens. In practice, the social works remained in the hands of 
government interventors and no d i s a f f i l i a t i o n of workers 
occurred, the latter continuing in social works associated with 
their occupation. At the end of 1988 a national health insurance 
law was approved which seeks to unify and rationalize the system. 
But because i t has not been regulated as of this writing, i t 
w i l l not be considered here. 
The social security system which results from the process 
described i s highly fragmented. In the National Social Security 
System, there are Funds for public and private sector workers and 
one for self employed workers which seeks to attract the non-
formalized labour sector. In addition, there are a set of spec-
i a l regimes for judicial and legislative o f f i c i a l s , armed and 
police forces and various agencies within public administration 
i t s e l f . There are special Funds for provincial and municipal 
government employees and special regimes for provincial judges, 
legislators, and police (in 1981 there were at least 67 provin-
c i a l pension Funds in existence). 
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At the time National Health Insurance was approved, there 
were around 300 social works schemes in existence, each with 
diverse administrative systems (unions of the private and public 
sector, state and "mixed" etc.)- In addition to institutional 
d i v e r s i t y , s o c i a l works were characterized by a great 
heterogeneity in number of a f f i l i a t e s and economic power. In 
1985 i t was estimated that 74% of the country's population was 
covered by the social works system (table 5) , but 50% of total 
beneficiaries were a f f i l i a t e d to 5 of these (pensioners, business 
employees, metallurgical and construction workers). That year, 
INSSJP had around 2,070,000 nominal members plus 904,000 as 
dependent family members (as a whole, they accounted for 13.3% of 
total population covered by the various social works in the 
country). For 1984, i t was estimated that 32% of joint social 
works' payouts corresponded to INSSJP, which gives an idea of the 
letter's importance within the social security system as a whole. 
The impact on expenditure resulting from the age composition of 
i t s a f f i l i a t e s explains, to a large extent, this situation: 25% 
of INSSJP a f f i l i a t e s were over 75 years of age (table 6). 
Fragmentation is one of the main characteristics of social 
security in Argentina and this translates into a total lack of 
coordination between services. Powerful sectorial interests have 
modelled the Argentine social security system, transforming i t 
into one which i s inequitable, irrational and markedly s t r a t i f -
ied. While sizeable sectors enjoy very high quality services, 
even holding multiple institutional coverage, others are totally 
devoid of any coverage. 
This lack of universality i s accompanied by great regional 
inequities. Estimates carried out in 1980 exclusively on the 
male population over 65, showed that while in the Federal Capital 
there existed the phenomenon of overcoverage, in the less devel-
oped provinces coverage was estimated at 30% to 40% (table 7) . 
Percentages are notably reduced i f we take into account legal 
ages for access to retirement (age 60 for males and 55 for femal-
es) : in 1980 i t was estimated that only 60% of the potential 
beneficiary population had access to this type of benefit. 
Institutional heterogeneity also poses inequities with 
regard to benefits granted for various special pensions program-
mes and conditions for accessing these. The various systems are 
characterized by differences in age requirement, years of con-
tribution and contribution quotas. In the area of medical atten-
tion, there are major economic differences among different 
social works: total per capita expenditure and medical per 
capita expenditure vary greatly among them (see table 8). 
With regard to INSSJP, although from the legal point of view 
a l l a f f i l i a t e s have the same right to u t i l i z a t i o n of services, in 
actuality additional complementary expenses and different bureac-
ratic procedures hamper compliance with standards. Supposedly, 
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a f f i l i a t e s ' contributions to the Institute should cover a l l 
medical expenses without there being a need for any additional 
expenses; in actuality, in many cases co-insurance stipulated by 
agreement has to be paid, and even direct differencial fees have 
to be paid to the professional at the time the medical service is 
rendered. The same coxnroents made on National Social Service 
System coverage apply in the case of INSSJP, given that the same 
group of beneficiaries is involved. 
The financial pensions programme situation has steadily 
worsened in the last years, becoming transformed into an element 
of p o l i t i c a l delegitimization. The f a l l in the potential 
dependence rate, high evasion, the existence of privileged 
regimes, the decline in real wage and the wage-earning rate in 
the economy are determinants in the financial c r i s i s . The 
situation i s not the same for the various Funds: the Industry 
and Commerce Fund has been subsidizing the rest of the system. 
Simultaneously, the National Treasury has recycled funds arising 
out of a highly regressive taxation system, to the detriment of 
other programmes. 
The dynamics of the financial deterioration process has been 
translated into an increase in the expenditure burden of the 
social security system as compared with public policies as a 
whole. Recent estimates place total expenditure of the Argentine 
public sector on the social security system at 9% of GDP at 
market prices. Out of that total, 6% would be the part destined 
for the national system, 1% for the special Funds which the Nat-
ional Treasury directly supports and the rest is for the provin-
c i a l and municipal employee systems. Comparatively speaking, the 
Argentine public sector spends 4% of GDP on education, 5.2% on 
health (including social works) and around 2.5% on housing, 
unemployment insurance and social assistance. 
Neatnesses in tax collection are reflected in the high 
indices of evasion. In 1983 i t is estimated that the Industry, 
Commerce and c i v i l Activities Fund had a potential support rate 
of 2.85 to one while the actual one was 2.46. The Self-Employed 
Workers Fund showed the inefficiency of social security schemes 
for incorporating non wage-earners: while the actual rate was 
estimated at 1.92 the potential one was approximately 3.3. The 
situation in the State Fund reflects the consegiiences of using 
the social security system as an instrument for perquisites: 
whereas the rate of support, assuming n i l evasion, was 1.4, the 
State Fund was the one which in 1985 paid the highest 
intermediate benefits and had the lowest weight of minimal wages 
over total wages. 
The lack of serious debate regarding possible alternatives 
and of p o l i t i c a l consensus regarding model depletion has allowed 
for the arising of isolated and contradictory actions. Towards 
the end of May 1988 a resolution by the Insurance Superintendency 
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was passed, authorizing the operation of insurance companies 
exclusively dedicated to granting retirement insurance and com-
plementary l i f e insurance. This type of operation began to be 
marketed as "private retirement" by groups of national and inter-
national financial entities and to date has had very l i t t l e 
market penetration. 
The very ambit of regulation of these ac t i v i t i e s (insurance) 
indicates their independence from the public pensions and 
retirement system. Nevertheless, i f f i s c a l and financial bene-
f i t s continue to be conceded, i t may prove attractive for high 
income sectors and powerful entrepreneurial groups. A l l this may 
result in the anarchic development of a complementary system 
which could rapidly contribute to delegitimize the public one 
even more. 
In summary, Argentina i s an example of a hybrid system, 
depleted in i t s capacity for development. On one hand, a public 
system exists whose legislation is inspired in s p i r i t and in 
mechanism by social insurance financed by capitalization methods, 
while in actuality i t functions as a deficit-showing distributive 
system. The absence of p o l i t i c a l consensus on the need for modif-
ying the systems•s functional bases fosters the development of 
private situations which increase fragmentation, inequity and 
lack of coordination between policies. 
2. Chile; Substitution of the Public System for a 
Private One Assisted by the State 
Chile, having been a pioneer in the institutionalization of 
social insurance, at the beginning of the seventies had one of 
the most fragmented and onerous systems of the region, while i t s 
benefits were among the most generous. The bases of the Chilean 
social security system were established in 1924-25 during the 
government of Arturo Alessandri Palma. At that time the most 
important pensions programmes were created: Social Insurance 
Service (SSS) which covered workers. Social Security Fund for 
Private Employees (EMPART) and the Public Employees and Journal-
i s t s ' Fund (CANAEMPU). In the f i f t i e s , independent pensions 
programmes multiplied, with even the establishment of different 
ones for the same professional category. 
from 19^8 oriHard, development of health insurance began and 
new benefits were incorporated (family allowance, unemployment 
insurance for private, railroad and municipal woriCers, maternity 
subsidies, etc). In 1952 the National Health Service (SNS) was 
created, which absorbed the original Workers' Illness-maternity 
Programme, incorporated other services and proposed assistance 
for indigent persons. The system's fragmentary dynamics became 
lapparent with the creation of a separate programme for white 
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collar employees, Employees National Medical Service (SERMENA), 
together with others for the armed forces, police, banking and 
other groups. 
The Chilean social security system, at the beginning of the 
seventies, was one of the most notorious examples of a fragmented 
and s t r a t i f i e d system. There were multiple pension programmes: 
for old age, according to seniority, disabi l i t y , illness-mater-
nity, family allowance, etc. Each institution had i t s own 
legislation and administration and granted different benefits, 
while at the same time various public bodies existed which were 
responsible for supervision. On the other hand, as a whole, i t 
had one of the most developed protection systems in Latin Amer-
ica: i t included a l l typical social risks, with generous benef-
i t s and liberal access conditions. In 1973 i t covered approxim-
ately 71.2% of the population and 75.9% of the working popul-
ation, and in health i t was outstanding for i t s services and 
coverage levels (see table 9). The cost of this system recorded 
an historic maximum in the early seventies: around 17% of GDP. 
The military dictatorship, with the elbow room obtained by 
coercively eliminating the social sectors' capacity for p o l i t i c a l 
pressure, in 1974 began one of.'the boldest refoirm undertakings of 
the social security system. Thus, between 1974 and 1979 costly 
privileges were eliminated, uniform and universal subsidies were 
introduced into the.unemployment insurance system, family allow-
ance amounts were equalized for the population as a whole and a 
common fund was created for them, a minimum uniform amount was 
set for pensions, seniority pensions were eliminated and age 
retirement was equalized, pension adjustment methods were unified 
and social service benefits were extended, employer contributions 
to pensions programmes were suspended while at the same time the 
two main health programmes (blue collar workers and white collar 
employees) were coordinated under the Ministry of Health. The 
reforms did not modify the occupational hazards programme and 
excluded the armed forces and the police, who continued to enjoy 
a preferential system. 
Once reforms in the State-administered systems were estab-
lished, in 1981 consolidation of the new social policy strategy 
was completed. Thne, new pensions and health systems were creat-
ed, administered by private corporations, for profit: Adminis-
trators of Pension Funds (AFP) and Institutes for Health Insur-
ance (ISAPRE). 
The new pensions system i s a mandatory, private, individual 
savings program for a l l workers (except the Armed Forces), with 
the i n i t i a l granting of a five year period to those who were 
under the state system, to a f f i l i a t e themselves under the private 
system. Since 1983 a l l wage-earning workers who enter into the 
labour market are forced to a f f i l i a t e themselves to the private 
system (where contributions are lower than those which existed 
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under the old system), while self-employed workers can do so 
voluntarily on their own. In 1987, 75% of working contributors 
were enrolled in the private system but 98% of pensioners and 
retirees were being paid by the state system. The logical out-
come i s that, while the State supports a large d e f i c i t in i t s 
social security programme, private financial institutions earn 
considerable profits, which feed the financial c i r c u i t . 
The old health systems (SNS and SERMENA) were unified under 
the Ministry of Health, and are administered by the National 
Health Fund (FONASA), which centralizes the public health budget. 
As opposed to the private pensions system, whose ultimate objec-
tive i s to substitute the public system, the private health 
system seeks to complement the public one. 
In 1987 the Social Insurance Programme (retirements and 
pensions) in i t s State segment, was assisted by 11 Social Secur-
i t y Funds, including those of Defense and Police, while there 
were 12 AFP, which administered the private system supervised by 
the Ministry of Labour. The Health Insurance Programme (illness-
maternity) came under the National Health Fund (FONASA) and the 
National System for Health Benefits (SNPS), while there were 25 
private ISAPRES, supervised by the Ministry of Health. 
In 1984 the Social Insurance Programme accounted for 58.5% 
of the net Social Security Budget for administrative expenses, 
and confirmed a rising trend, despite privitizatlon (table 10) . 
Thus, the public sector began to allocate a greater portion of 
the social budget to support the consequences of the pensions 
programme transfer to the private sector. According to estimat-
es, the social security d e f i c i t accounted for 5% of GDP for the 
State in 1985, while the AFP undertook financial investments 
equivalent to 29% of total financial system deposits, or 50% of 
term deposits (Frediani, 1986). In December 1986, AFP financial 
investments were tied up as follows: 46.7% in State financial 
instruments issued by the Central Bank or the National General 
Treasury, 25.5% in short term mortgage bonds issued by o f f i c i a l 
and private banks; 23% in fixed term deposits and only 3.76% in 
shares issued by private companies (table 11). 
In this way, a strong State presence was observed in the 
formation of the AFP rate of return. Although legislation sets 
maximum limits for each type of financial investment claim held, 
those used up to the maximum involved precisely pviblic assets. 
Besides, the State not only guaranteed a minimum rate of return 
for funds, which i s related to the average interest rate of the 
economy, but also guaranteed a minimum pension level. If to this 
we add the high concentration of the insured in a few AFP (2 of 
the 12 AFP concentrate half the number of insured) not only does 
the argument of market competitiveness lose ground but i t accent-
uates the idea of prebendary capitalism as being an inescapable 
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requirement for this type of system to function, at least with 
the small capital markets of Latin America. 
The age structure of individuals a f f i l i a t e d to the state 
system leads one to forecast that i t w i l l continue up into the 
f i r s t quarter of the next century. In 1987 i t had 448,000 
working contributors and had to pay 655,800 beneficiaries from 9 
Social Security Funds. To this one must add 60,000 passives in 
the National Defense Social Security Fund (Armed Forces) and 
44,000 in the Police Social Security Administration which, in 
1985, received pensions four times greater than the average of 
c i v i l i a n Funds. 
In general. State employees have not enrolled for AFP ser-
vices because benefits obtained from the public system are bet-
ter. Thus, i t may be affirmed that the public social security 
system d e f i c i t , in particular, benefits state employees them-
selves. This i s yet another facet of Chile's p o l i t i c a l paradox: 
an authoritarian and repressive State which claims to encourage 
private responsibility over public yet offers perquisites to i t s 
own employees and guarantees rates of return to entrepreneurs in 
their a c t i v i t i e s . 
The impact of the reform on trends in the number of passives 
was significant. While in 1980 there were 1,070,000 Social 
Security beneficiaries (9.6% of total population), in 1987 this 
number had dropped to 702,300 (5.6% of total population). This 
reduction i s complemented by a drop in coverage rate. Recent 
estimates place coverage in 1987 at 56.7% of total population and 
50.7% of working population, while in 1980 these percentages were 
67.3% and 61.3% respectively (see table 9). 
These actual coverage figures contrast with the s p i r i t of 
the legislation which i s one of the broadest in Latin America. 
In effect, in Chile a l l wage earners are legally covered 
(including agricultural labourers and domestics) and self 
employed workers (who had mandatory coverage under the old system 
but voluntary under the new). Although i t i s probable that the 
s t a t i s t i c a l clearing undertaken by partially unifying the system 
did eliminate multiple a f f i l i a t i o n s , the magnitude of the drop 
evidently deserves sounder explanations. 
There i s a high proportion of the population without social 
security coverage in Chile, and the two main causes seem to be 
high unemployment rates and evasion of the system. In the last 
decade, Chile had one of the highest open unemployment rates in 
Latin America: despite i t s reduction in the last few years, in 
1984-1987 i t reached 14%. To this is added the majority of self-
employed workers who do not enroll in the system (in early 1983, 
96% of those a f f i l i a t e d to AFP were wage-earners) and those who 
are under special compensatory employment programmes for out-of-
work Heads of Households. 
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In the case of self-employed workers, the Chilean experience 
demonstrates that, at least in labour markets such as those of 
Latin America, actual coverage of self-employed workers through a 
social security plan i s unthinkable (whether i t be mandatory or 
voluntary, private or state). In early 1982, i t was estimated 
that only 21% of self employed workers were incorporated into the 
social security system (state and private). Those who do not 
join the social insurance system had the right to an assistance 
annuity, free health attention and special family allowance. In 
other words, the Chilean system institutionalized market-derived 
differences and fragmentation: benefits of one kind for those 
with the capacity to repay and assistancialism for lower income 
levels. 
It i s also interesting to note that not even privatization 
of the system has succeeded in eliminating evasion. In 1987, 
out of over 2,600,000 a f f i l i a t e s , only 1,600,000 regularly cont-
ributed to AFP's. A l l these indicators cast certain doubts as to 
the efficacy of the market and of private management for meeting 
demands. Between May 1981 and May 1986 the private system absor-
bed around 1,600,000 working contributors under the old system 
while in 1987 i t paid only^-35,000 benefits, out of which only 10% 
were for old age. (Frediani, 1986) . It i s not surprising that 
the working/passive ratio in the state system is 0.68 (without 
taking into accpunt the Armed Forces and Police) while for the 
entire system i t is 3.2. This factor, added to transfers to the 
private sector carried out by the State in recognition of 
previous contributions by those now enrolled in the private 
AFP's, explain the State system's d e f i c i t . 
Thus, private saving has accumulated at the expense of the 
public d e f i c i t . The Pensions Fund accumulated up to 1987 was 
equivalent to 11.5% of GDP, approximately 2 years of national 
savings and 2.5 times the value of Ml (currency plus sight depos-
its) . The other side of the coin is the increase in the social 
security def i c i t , which in 1981, when privitizatlon commenced, 
was equivalent to 1.7% of GDP and in 1987 had risen to 5.5%. A l l 
indicators permit one to forecast that i t w i l l continue to grow. 
On the other hand, the private system mechanism has been 
fundamental in accentuating the concentration of financial cap-
i t a l . Seventy percent of the Fund i s accumulated in only 4 AFP, 
and, controlling their own insurance companies and major banks, 
they wield enormous power of control over the functioning of the 
economy. What i s interesting i s that while the Pensions Fund 
grows at an increasing rate, the limited nature of the Chilean 
capital market forces investment of the greater part of the Fund 
in public securities or in the o f f i c i a l banking system. This 
should not be interpreted as an unexpected outcome, but rather as 
a logical effect of the system's own functioning; one could even 
think that i t is a requirement for i t s own survival. 
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A similar transformation i s taking place in the health 
system. The ISAPRES are absorbing those persons with higher 
incomes while the National Health Fund (FONASA) i s undergoing 
capital depletion because i t has to absorb lower income workers. 
It i s interesting to note that, because a f f i l i a t i o n i s not 
mandatory, the evolution of ISAPRES, although significant, has 
been less than that of AFP. In 1987, ISAPRES had approximately 
1,200,000 a f f i l i a t e s , of which only 300,000 were contributors and 
the rest dependent family members. It i s not to be wondered at 
then that in 1986, the State SNSS dealt with around 73% of 
medical appointments of the entire health system and covered 
90.5% of hospitalization days (Ministry of Health, 1988). 
In summary, Chile is an atypical case within the region, but 
i t undoubtedly exemplifies a possible scenario for the future. 
The military dicatatorship government has clearly shown, in a l l 
i t s crudity, the extent to which institutions are subordinate to 
the prevailing economic and social strategy in effect at a given 
moment in history. 
3. Costa Rica; P o l i t i c a l Consensus. Rapid Development 
and their Limits 
Costa Rica is one of the countries that established the basic 
institutions of i t s social security system in the forties. 
Consequently, the system's structure was heavily influenced by 
the ILO and the Beveridge Report recommendations, in terms of 
institutional unification and centralization. Despite i t s late 
appearance and at scarcely twenty years of development, in the 
last three decades Costa Rica has advanced at a breakneck pace, 
to the part where i t now shows indicators typical of more mature 
systems. 
In the f i r s t four decades of this century, scant indus-
t r i a l i z a t i o n and lack of p o l i t i c a l participation prevented the 
development of social security institutions beyond certain easily 
granted pensions and independent pension funds for certain public 
servants. In 1941 the institutional bases of the current social 
security system were established with the creation of the Costa 
Rican Social Insurance Fund (CCSS), whose two main programmes, 
administered within the social insurance scheme, were that of 
illness-maternity and that of pensions. Nevertheless, the 
independent funds which existed at that time were not absorbed by 
the Fund; on the contrary, others (always linked to public 
services) were progressively added later . 
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Up u n t i l the early sixties only a small proportion of the 
urban labour force, concentrated in the capital, was covered by 
CCSS. As of that time, coverage was extended to workers in 
industry, construction and commerce, while at the same time the 
wage ceilings which had excluded workers earning medium and high 
wages were raised. In the seventies, wage ceilings were elimin-
ated and coverage was extended to the remainder of agricultural 
workers, self-employed, and to domestics. Pensioners were 
incorporated into the health programme and a social services 
programme was introduced, which granted pensions and health ser-
vices to indigent persons. Around 1980, approximately two thirds 
of Costa Rica's population was covered by social insurance. 
The rapid extension of CCSS coverage in the seventies is 
distinctive in certain aspects. The high proportion of wage-
earning workers as opposed to self employed workers and unpaid 
family workers, low open unemployment and underemployment rates, 
lower proportions of labour force in agriculture and the small 
size of the country, are some of the factors which allowed for 
this process. To this favourable context was added p o l i t i c a l 
consensus, even shaped in a constitutional amendment in 1961, 
which gave a definite boost to making coverage universal. 
The other facet of this accelerated development is seen in 
the increase in social security expenditure (see table 12) . In 
1980 the cost of social security in Costa Rica, as a percentage 
of GDP, placed Costa Rica at levels similar to those of pioneer 
countries. But unlike the majority of these, the basic burden 
lay in health expenditure and not in the pensions programme: in 
1980 Costa Rica headed Latin America in per capita health 
expenditure. Health indicators reflect the results of this 
process: between 1960 and 1982 health coverage of the population 
under CCSS grew from 15% to 77%, the infant mortality rate 
dropped from 69 to 18 per thousand and l i f e expectancy increased 
to over 71 years of age. 
In 1974-78 a l l Ministry of Health hospitals were placed 
under CCSS, v/ith the former being l e f t responsibility then for 
the administration of programmes for preventive medicine, 
indigent persons (both rural and urban) and child nutrition. 
Three quarters of CCSS expenditure in 1982 went to illnes s -
maternity and the remainder to the pensions programme, which, 
nevertheless, already showed a marked tendency to increase i t s 
share in expenditures. The demographic load quotient has 
progressively increased in the last few years, although the 
situation appears to be more d i f f i c u l t for independent funds 
which have been established longer than those administered by 
CCSS. 
The increase in the number of pensioners, a product of the 
system's own maturity, had already begun to be f e l t by the mid 
seventies. A large part of the reserve funds of the taxable 
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pensions prograitune has been used to subsidize the il l n e s s -
maternity programme and i t is probable that i t s market value w i l l 
not be regained in the future. 
The social security system in Costa Rica is quite uniform 
and administratively unified. CCSS, an autonomous institution, 
administers practically a l l the country's curative medicine, 
through the illness-maternity programme and social assistance 
programmes attended to by public funds. Services are rendered 
directly by CCSS, which even has a hospital specializing in 
geriatrics. Some experimentation with private sector agreements 
has commenced, given that CCSS has been facing financial 
problems in the last few years and has problems in continuing to 
absorb the medical personnel of the country. This institution 
also operates the taxable (old age, disability, death) and non-
taxable pensions programmes. 
The sector of the population not insured for health by CCSS 
includes high income non-wage earners who, although they could 
voluntarily be insured, in practice pay for their own medical 
attention; wage-earners who evade their obligation of becoming 
a f f i l i a t e d to the Fund and are attended as indigents; those low 
resource non-wage earners who receive assisted attention or who 
work for a relative, although - despite their not being directly 
insurable - they could be insured as dependents. The uninsured 
can turn to Ministry of Health's services. 
CCSS administers two pensions programmes: that of Disabil-
ity, Old Age or Death and the Non Taxable Regime. Recent infor-
mation indicates that the f i r s t programme covers approximately 
46% of working population and the second slightly over 4% (Bren-
es, 1986). Although data sources vary and one cannot establish 
methodological differences, these levels of coverage are lower 
than those estimated by ECLAC (table 13). Non taxable pensions 
are subscribed to in basic amounts and are financed by transfers 
(a percentage from the Social Development Fund and the Family 
Allowance Programme). 
The Mixed Institute for Social Assistance i s responsible for 
supervising and for social welfare services aimed at senior 
citizens. Independent funds are administered to a large extent 
by the Ministry of Labour and their beneficiaries are public 
employees. Although they are not as marked as in countries with 
more fragmented regimes, major differences exist between pensions 
paid to different professional groups (table 14). 
A contradiction arises within the State i t s e l f regarding 
organization principles which are supposedly adopted for the rest 
of the social security system. This i s a l l the more serious i f 
one considers that the State's contribution to independent funds, 
in relation to other sources of financing, i s greater than that 
which i t provides CCSS. In other words, in Costa Rica p r i v i l -
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eged regimes also co-exist, despite i t s having one of the most 
rational situations of the region. 
•4. Ecuador; The Boost by Peasant Social Insurance 
A regime of benefits with typical social security characteristics 
was initiated in Ecuador in 1928, with the creation of the f i s c a l 
and municipal employees and teachers' Pension Fund, which was 
responsible for protective as well as cooperative and financial 
actions. In 1935 the National Social Security Institute was 
created for the purpose of implementing the Mandatory General 
Insurance regime, and from then onward, various Funds were prog-
ressively created to incorporate other occupational groups. In 
terms of benefit development, in 1928 the f i r s t retirement regime 
was established for disability, old age and survivors; in 1937 
illness-maternity benefits and only recently from 1957 onward was 
the process of granting unemployment benefits begun. 
The sixties and seventies were characterized by integration 
of the system, merging of Funds under the Ecuadorian Social 
Security Institute (lESS) as a unitary, national and obligatory 
model. From 1964 onward, coverage - which up until that point 
had only reached those with stable and formalized work - was 
expanded; craftsmen, domestics and construction workers, etc. 
were incorporated. 
Although Peasant Social Security was established in 1968, 
only recently in 1981 was the "Law for the Extension of Peasant 
Social Security" enacted, where by progressive broadening was 
established to include a l l members of a peasant family, whether 
they belonged to communes, cooperative associations or any other 
form of organization, as well as those who, while not belonging 
to any organization, expressed the desire to a f f i l i a t e 
themselves. As a result, in 1986, 1364 organizations and approx-
imately 434,000 beneficiaries were covered (between 1980 and 1986 
those insured by Peasant Social Insurance increased at a yearly 
cumulative rate of 26.11%). That year, i t was estimated that 
13.4% of the total population and 36.5% of working population was 
covered by social insurance in Ecuador (Ribadeneira et a l , 1988). 
The coverage growth process has been slow and in the eighties was 
due fundamentally to the impetus of Peasant Social Insurance 
(table 15). 
Coverage by sector of the economy approximately reproduces 
the working population of the country. The greater percentage of 
benefits i s concentrated in the tertiary sector (42% of total 
working population), while the secondary sector has only approx-
imately 17% coverage (table 16) . Growth of primary sector 
coverage as a result of Peasant Social Security, has meant an 
increase from 10.84% in 1982 to 26.24% in 1984 (table 17). 
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TO a certain extent, this has gone hand in hand with the 
intense growth of the agricultural product during the period of 
1985-87. Estimates for 1988 suggest that this performance has 
markedly decreased, while unemployment climbed to 13%. This has 
been offset, to a certain extent, by the increase in o i l produc-
tion, after the dramatic drop registered in 1987. 
The Institute grants a l l a l l types of benefits: insurance 
against illness, disability, old age, death, occupational hazards 
and unemployment. These programmes are financed through 
personal, employer and State contributions, the latter being 
equivalent to 40% of retirement benefits due to old age and 
death, and in addition, by profits from capital investments by 
lESS. 
Within the Institute i t s e l f , the typical contradiction is 
apparent in financing of the various social policies: the 
health programme is financed by a simple method of distribution 
and pensions by capitalization. Over the last few years, there 
has been a major increase in medical benefit expenditures (table 
18), with funding being recycled from pensions programme surplus. 
In terms of investment of surplus from the capitalization 
fund, Ecuador provides a clear example of the parcity of avenues 
available for this in Latin American countries with weak capital 
market development. The average rate of return on investments 
for the period 1978-83 was a yearly 9% in the face of average 
inflation of 30%. In addition, a major part of investments were 
in securities emitted or guaranteed by the State. 
Besides, the State does not meet i t s obligations with the 
system, but permanently reschedules i t s debt. To a certain 
extent, lESS became a source of cheap resources for the State. 
Its financial activities are multiple and range from investment 
in productive and service companies to land purchases and 
mortgage loans. Liquidity, which has characterized the 
Institute, i s a permanent source of financing for other State 
agencies and, indirectly, for private capital through i t s 
investments. 
Certain conclu.sions may be drawn from the Ecuadorian 
experience. The high percentage of working population in the 
primary sector makes extension of coverage dependent on the 
capacity to attract this sector of labour. To this end, various 
instruments must be resorted to, which link policy not only to 
individuals but primarily to their social organizations. On the 
other hand, the social security scheme, in this case applied to a 
system under formation and relatively undeveloped, shows the same 
defects as more mature ones. The inability to maintain the 
market value of funds accumulated, the attraction of these to 
other ends, the reproduction of fragmentation and inequities are 
characteristic of the Ecuadorian case as well. 
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III. THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE PROBLEM 
OF OLD AGE 
There i s a traditional evolutionist view which sees social 
security systems as a road of no return towards a principled end. 
Solidarity, equity and universality are the organizational 
principles which are supposed to rule the system in i t s final 
stage. Everything i s reduced to a matter of timing, inputs and 
outputs are perfectly defined: there is man with a determined 
set of contingencies and a service which satisfies them. 
Nevertheless, man i s a "placed" being and institutions are 
constructs and regulations heavily conditioned by the environment 
which serves as a reference for them. The actions and reactions 
which define the institutions do not always determine dynamics 
with a univocal direction: the final stage may well be indeter-
minate. One cannot talk of the future of social security in 
Latin America and the Caribbean without expressly assuming a 
future scenario for the societies of the region. 
This does not seem to be very promising from the economic 
point of view. The region's aggregate GDP, which had increased 
more than 80% between 1970 and 1980, grew by only 8% in 1980-86, 
while population increased by 15%. The gross investment coef-
fici e n t of the region, which was approximately 23% of GDP, on 
average, during the 1970's, has decreased to an average of 
barely over 15%. The net flow of capital vis-a-vis the rest of 
the world turned negative as of 1982, while the external debt 
continued to accumulate. In this way, the pivotal issue of the 
vicious c i r c l e of underdevelopment - the insufficiency of capital 
- continues without any avenues of solution being found in the 
region. Even the rise in international prices, confirmed in 
1988, of numerous products which the region exports, with the 
exception of o i l , did not translate into an improvement of the 
situation, because i t was neutralized by an increase in transfers 
to the exterior. 
The f i r s t estimates on performance in 1988 do not allow for 
optimism. Per capita output of Latin America and the Caribbean 
decreased for the f i r s t time since the 1981-83 recession, drop-
ping to a value 6.5% below that of 1980. According to ECLAC, 
between 1980 and 1988 per capita product dropped by 39% in Trin-
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idad and Tobago, more than 26% in Nicaragua and Bolivia, 24% in 
Panama, around 20% in Guatemala and Haiti, 15% in Argentina, El 
Salvador and Venezuela, 14% in Honduras and Peru and 11% in 
Mexico. After increasing by almost 4% in 1986 and 2.5% in 1987, 
the region's GDP grew by only 0.7% in 1988. 
Stabilization plans managed to stem inflation in only a few 
countries. The average rate of increase of consumer prices, 
weighted by population, surpassed 470% in 1988, thus more than 
doubling the previous year's record. The effect on the personal 
income of wage-earners can be easily deduced. 
The f i s c a l d e f i c i t , despite having decreased in many cases, is a 
constant in the region, essentially pressured by capital servic-
ing (external to internal). From 1982 onward, a trend i s per-
ceived towards reducing public expenditure. In 1985, two thirds 
of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean had decreased 
the participation of transfers and subsidies in the public 
expenditure total. On the other hand, internal revenue is the 
main source of financing for central governments, giving a marked 
regressive slant to f i s c a l collection. The pressing need for 
financing, and problems in collection, have even caused a shift in 
the tax burden from personal income taxes to taxes on goods and 
services and other forms of indirect taxation. 
A l l this provides a context for a productive sector which 
faces the dilemma of juxtaposing rapid expansion of production 
and installed capacity, with a restructuring process and the 
improvement of productivity. The outlook i s not optimistic with 
a panorama of c r i t i c a l strangulation by the external sector, 
decline in terms of trade, acute unemployment, limited potential 
for import substitution, intensification of competition in 
international markets and transformation of supply and demand in 
them. 
On the other hand, the sustained increase in l i f e expectancy 
has determined the absolute and relative increase in the old age 
population. This i s yet another fact which i s added to a very 
complex and conflictive social reality. However, i t is not a 
fact which is exogenous to the social security system, but rather 
an outcome of i t s own operational dynamic and of the type of 
social model which this institutional set up implies. The 
State's in a b i l i t y to deal with this new reality may result in a 
conflictive paradox. The p o l i t i c a l legitimacy implicit in a 
system which ensures coverage of the future can be transformed 
into delegitimization of the present. 
This delegitimization involves the passive population i t s e l f 
as well as the working population, because the future of social 
protection systems w i l l depend to a large extent on the trans-
formations which the labour force is now undergoing. Worthy of 
mention among these are the stabilization of i t s agricultural 
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component, the increase in female participation, the slowdown in 
growth of the labour force, the rise in unemployment (open and 
disguised) and the larger number of informal workers. 
In a context of disinvestment, one of the major problems 
w i l l continue to be the insufficient dynamism of the industrial 
sector to absorb labour force. Thus exerting pressure on the 
services labour market and on the State's employment policy. A l l 
of this w i l l greatly hinder continuing progress in coverage and 
in the provision of social security system services. 
The logical limit which the wage contract mechanism typical 
to social insurance faces in the formal labour market, becomes 
more acute in Latin America. The exclusionist nature of i t s 
economies, the heterogeneity and fragmentation typical of the 
labour market are reproduced in pensions programmes. The neut-
r a l i t y or regressiveness of these programmes, in terms of income 
distribution, are the result of both their own organization prin-
ciple and the socio-economic environment in which they operate. 
On one hand revenues are collected on nominal salaries 
which, given the imperfect structure of markets, are easily 
transferrable to prices pr to employment levels, setting a 
balance point below f u l l employment. On the other hand, finan-
c i a l imbalances, primarily in countries with mature systems, are 
dealt with by using contributions from the national treasury 
whose collection methods give prerogative to indirect taxes. 
The regressive context worsens i f we consider that a significant 
part of the population has no coverage, yet finances the system 
as taxpayers. 
Likewise, given the way in which pensions programmes are 
organized, i t becomes very d i f f i c u l t to plan and coordinate their 
dynamic with that of the remainder of public policies. The 
latter ussually function with a mechanism typical to f i s c a l pol-
icy: revenues are collected along "taxable bases" and expendit-
ures are made according to p o l i t i c a l l y determined p r i o r i t i e s . On 
the other hand, in pensions programmes, and in social security 
systems in general, certain requirements are needed to access 
"rights". These rights are individual and their values are 
measurable according to established c r i t e r i a , which fac i l i t a t e s 
the advance of their expenditure over the rest. But because in 
addition, these rights are acquired by meeting contribution 
quotas, the abrupt f a l l in personal income in broad sectors of 
the population has repercussions in the form of a loss of capac-
ity to acquire them. 
A l l of this has clouded the very objectives of social secur-
it y policy and in particular, of pensions programmes. The origin 
of these programmes did not l i e in the phenomenon of the aging of 
the population but rather was a mechanism for labour market 
regulation, as part of a social contract. But the agreement was 
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based on the working, not the passive, labour force. With the 
passage of time, the system i t s e l f has created a new social 
category which demands, pressures and even defines policy orien-
tations: retirees. In democratic and participative p o l i t i c a l 
systems, this pressure becomes more explicit and conflictive. 
P o l i t i c a l delegitimization of this new reality deepens as 
dependence shifts from working population to the State: to a 
certain extent there is a new "dependency ratio" which is 
determined by considering those whose incomes depend on the 
State (who are not necessarily non-productive, as the elderly are 
assumed to be, but rather encompasses those who are unemployed, 
underemployed, indigent, etc.). This is the logical outcome of a 
social agreement which shifted the conflicts linked to the mode 
of production, onto the State's lap. 
The denouement i s uncertain. The case of Chile i s i l l u s t -
rative. A coercive attempt is made to remove conflict from the 
State, but paradoxically conflict returns indirectly via finan-
c i a l and p o l i t i c a l dependence. There is demand "induced" by the 
current social security system i t s e l f , which views the pensions 
programme seirvice as a defferred salary, thus immediately iden-
t i f y i n g i t as an individual savings system. The problem shifts 
to defining who i s capable of guaranteeing the maintenance of 
market value of said savings. In certain countries, the State 
failed to achieve this and in others i t i s headed in that direc-
tion, which leaves room for attempting other results with the 
private sector, assisted by the State. 
This i s an outlet which may define the future of certain 
systems, but there i s lack of debate as to i t s implications. The 
need for countries to be integrated into the world economy and 
for modernization of the productive apparatus' through mechanisms 
which favours obsolescence of capital equipment over ordinary 
wear and tear, renders the old scheme of the autonomous and 
competitive financial system non-functional. The new dynamic of 
the capitalist reproduction process needs organizations with 
greater power of disposal and control over the various cycles of 
capital valuation. 
Formation of these autonomous capital valuation centres 
requires adequate financial conditions. In particular i t is 
necessairy to have available large masses of capital that can be 
circulated. In prolonged recessive periods, like those exper-
ienced lately by countries of the region, stagnation in the 
formation and renovation of fixed capital causes major swings in 
cash-flow u t i l i z a t i o n and in the formation of liquid funds which 
can be withdrawn from the circulatory valuation movement. The 
variety of securities representative of monetary capital f a c i l i t -
ates exchanges and massive transfer operations, as well as the 
integration of major financial institutions integrated with major 
productive centres. 
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The boom in social security policies coincided with a Key-
nesian view of the economy where what was important was "to 
stabilize consumption". The neoclassical resurgence has inverted 
the problem and now i t i s a matter of "stabilizing saving", where 
centre stage i s dominated by those who can save and not those who 
claim consumption capacity. Those who attract savings via priv-
ate insurance mechanisms, such as those implemented in Chile or 
those rough-draughted in Argentina and Brazil, obtain long term 
financing and at a low cost from their own current expenditure 
(cost of hiring labour) . This cost drops even more i f one con-
siders tax benefits which are usually granted. 
With these funds, and with a reduced capital market, investment 
alternatives consist of t i t l e deeds of controlled companies or 
the public debt. In a context of great restriction of external 
credit and of enormous problems in f i s c a l collection, this form 
of domestic debt creation may be tempting. But the other side of 
the problem i s presented by the onerous nature of public finan-
cing and by the control which w i l l be obtained from future f i s c a l 
collections by those who control these funds. This w i l l undoub-
tedly detract p o l i t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y from the State, delegitimiz-
ing i t s actions and fostering institutional fragmentation. 
This i s a reality which may appear alient to the least 
developed countries, but which should illuminate the debate on 
their near future. Broadening of social coverage i s their most 
urgent problem, but they cannot develop without considering the 
link to the p o l i t i c a l and economic context. Economic development 
and social security are processes which are mutually connected 
through distinctive and shared contradictions. 
The elderly population is one of the most vulnerable groups 
in a context such as the one described, through their very non-
working condition. Few other sectors see the present being 
confused with the future and feel so strongly the dearth of 
alternatives. In summary, their problem depends greatly on the 
economic situation. 
Nevertheless, this should not create the false image which 
attributes a l l problems of social security systems to the econ-
omic c r i s i s . There, are flaws int r i n s i c to their very principles 
of organization, which magnify the effects of the c r i s i s . In any 
case, the c r i s i s , by exposing them crudely, offers opportunities 
for reviewing the very bases of their foundation. 
33 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BRENES, Jorge, (1986) "Situación actual de los regímenes de 
pensión de la seguridad social en América Latina" (Current 
Situation of the Social Security Pension System in Latin 
America), AISS: Estudios de la Seguridad Social Nos. 
61/62. 
DIEGUEZ, Héctor & PETRECOLLA, Alberto, (1974), "La distribución 
funcional del ingreso y el sistema previsional en Argentina, 
1950-1972)" (Functional Distribution of Income and the 
Social Security System in Argentina, 1950-1972), Desarrollo 
Económico No. 55, Vol. XIV, Oct-Dec. 
FELDMAN, J., GOLBERT, L. & ISUANI, E., (1986), "Maduración y 
c r i s i s del sistema previsional argentino" (Maturation and 
Cr i s i s in the Argentine Social Security System), Boletín 
Informativo Techint No. 24 0, Buenos Aires, Jan-Feb. 
FREDIANI, Ramón, (1986), "Exigencia y realidad de l a política 
social en América Latina: comparación y funcionamiento de 
los sistemas de seguridad social en Chile y Uruguay", 
(Demands and Reality of Social Policy in Latin America: 
Comparison and Functioning of the Social Security Systems in 
Chile and Uruguay), Santiago, Chile: CIEDLA. 
GOLBERT, Laura, (1988) , "El envejecimiento de la población y la 
seguridad social", (Aging of the Population and Social 
Security), Boletín Informativo Techint, No. 251, Jan-Feb-
March 
ISUANI, Ernest & MERCER, Hugo, (1986), "La fragmentación 
institucional del sector salud en Argentina: ¿pluralismo o 
irracionalidad?" (Institutional Fragmentation of the Health 
Sector in Argentina: Pluralism or Irrationality?), Boletín 
Informativo Techint No. 244. 
MESA LAGO, Carmelo, (1978), "Social Security in Latin America: 
Pressure Groups, Stratification and Inequality", Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press. 
34 
MESA LAGO, Carmelo, (1985), "El desarrollo de l a seguridad social 
en América Latina", (Social Security Development in Latin 
America), Santiago, Chile: ECLAC studies and reports No. 
43. 
MINISTERIO DE SALUD DE CHILE, (1988), "Indicadores 
Biodemográficos y algunas a c t i v i d a d e s de salud" 
(Biodemographic Indicators and Some Health Activities), 
Santiago, Chile: Mimeo. 
MOLES, Ricardo, (1987), "La seguridad social en la region de las 
Américas" (Social Security in the region of the Americas) , 
AISS: Estudios de la Seguridad Social No. 63/64. 
I.L.O., (1967), "La seguridad social en las Américas" (Social 
Security in the Americas), Mexico-Geneva. 
RIBADENEIRA, M. et a l . (1988), "El seguro social y l a seguridad 
social en Ecuador: una visión crítica" (Social Insurance 
and Social Security in Ecuador: A C r i t i c a l View), Quito: 
paper presented at the international seminar "New 
Orientations in Social Foley in Latina America and the 
Caribbean", CONADE-ILPES/ECLAC-ILDIS, August. 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, (1988), Social 
Security Programs Throughout the World. 1985, Washington: 
Social Security Administration, Office of Research and 
Statistics. 
APPENDIX I: TABLES 
37 
Table 1 
lADN íiMLCk: OPCERDC M) GEJCÜPDC OF CCINIKIES AOTDIfE TD SOCIAL SEOEIIY EEVEIÍHfNr: 1980 
Ini-tláL ItapuLatdon Iteroerta^ Social security esqperriituce 
Graups/ pensions covered ̂ / of legal as % 
countries law^/ oontribut. ̂  
Ibtal Wbddng GCP Kscal ItensifltB 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
6 69 81 33 IL 39 79 
Arj^ntina 6 79 69 46 10 38 55 
Chue 6 67 62 29 U. 32 53 
Qix^ 6 100 93 10 9 B 4i 
Efcazil 6 96 % 26 5 38 45 
Costa Pirfl 4 78 68 27 9 36 21 
Tvpical ranpe h/ 6 67-100 62-% 26^ 9-U 32-39 44-79 
InbemnediatE goxp 
4 50 46 21 7 23 % 
tfexioo 4 53 42 18 3 18 2L 
Item 5 17 37 21 3 15 35 
Cblcnbiai/ 4 12 22 20 4 20 20 
Bolivia 3 25 18 25 3 14 ¿C 
Bajador 5 8 23 21 3 10 48 
Itoagosy 4 18 14 20 2 22 31 
AfenezueLa 2 45 50 14 3 15 33 
Tvpical range V 3-5 12-53 18-50 18-25 3-7 14-23 20-40 
low gtap 
Damrican RepiiDlic 4 8 14 14 2 16 2L 
QjatHiaL^ 2 14 33 20 2 14 14 
EL Salva±>r 3 6 12 12 2 12 IB 
NLcaragw 3 9 19 16 2 19 16 
HDixura&J/ 3 7 13 14 3 12 7 
Haití. 2 1 2 12 1 ... 10 
Tvpical range h/ 2-3 1-9 2-19 12-16 1-2 12-15 7-18 
3 8 















(S) Î9̂  ClÔ  (m 
Hidi gttxx) 
(60) 0.65 10.4 70 
Argentina (B) 0.32 8.2 69 
Chile 17 0.^ 5.5 68 
Oha^ (^) 0.21 7.3 73 
B c ^ i l (7) 0.18 4.0 64 
CbstaRLca 0 0.06 3.6 TL 
TvDical ranee h/ o-(eo) 0.18-0.65 4.0-10.4 68-7Î 
Intermedlate group 
m 0.12 4.4 70 Ifedoo 17 o.œ 3.6 64 
Iteru 12 0.09 3.6 58 
Cblctibiai/ (8) 0.05 3.5 62 
BoHvia 8 0.33 3.2 51 
Ecuador 36 0.15 3.5 60 
Ikragj^ 15 0.07 3.4 64 
\feneaj¿La 26 0.06 2.8 66 






























Typical Rar^ h/ 3;34 0.02-0.08 2.4-3.4 51-60 
T̂ /or StatlstlcsYeaaixxfe Iteparts and other official publicatians 
ff, Nuiber c£ decades pre'váous to 1980 in vhixli the first pension laa appeaÎBd. 
-/ Itercedtage cf total p:çuLatÍDn ocr̂ ered hy tiie sickness prcgrame ana of vjoddrg popuLatdon covered ty the 
, pensions prcgranme. 
-/ Total of J e ^ percentage ábo\« ncrainaL salary ̂ dnlch the ensured, enplq^^rs and State nust oortxibutE as 
,, axh. 
Social security ejçienditure includes total health cost. 
-/ Deficit or profit, rejaiLtirg fixm subtractirig esçencüture ñxm tntal social security re\«nje, as a 
o, percentage of reverue. 
Í/ Darcfflannic buctífen qj3tient: ruiber of passives insured (pensioners) dLvLded by Üie njiber of warkirg 
, pcpiSticn iiBured (oaitribubars). 
1981 for dba and Urqgj^ only some figjres, o d i ^ ocrrespond to 1980. 
Cialculated sibtractinE an ouifllea: maxinun. v. 1979. 
j / 1982. 
lbtaL_ 
populatdon 
TuKm PtESLCk: TDIÎl.NI)\Œm;WBim:ïi COMEDm 9Jm.WSm, 1980 


















28.237 22.278 78.9 10.3 10.690 7.391 69.1 10.5 
5.570 1.412 25.4 0.7 1.754 32i 18.5 0.5 
121.286 116 800 96.3 54.1 40.292 38.523 95.6 54.6 
25.2Í7 2.925 11.6 1.4 8.477 1.900 . 22.4 1.1 
2.279 1.733̂,, 76.0p, 0.8 770 526§r 68.3-,, 0.7 9.724 9.72i^ moE/ 4.5 3.618 3 "^S^ 93.0&̂  4.8 1L.10Í 7.41S 67.3 3.5 3.788 2̂ 337 61.7 3.3 
8.021 636 7.9 0.3 2.393 555 23.2 0.8 
4.797 iuu 6.2 0.1 1.61L 187 1L.6 0.3 
7.480 1.06Í , 14.2 0.5 2.314 767 , 33.1 1.1 5.809 bi^ 0.8 - 2.815 4 ^ 1.6 0.1 3.955 288 7.3 0.1 1.172 155 14.4 0.2 
69.393 37.056 53.4 17.2 19.423 8.158 42.0 1L.6 
2.77L 253 9.1 0.1 773 146 18.9 0.2 
1.956 985 50.3 0.4 701 319 45.6 0.4 
3.158 575 18.2 0.3 1.Ü// 151 14.0 0.2 17.295 3.016 17.4 1.4 5.719 2.142 37.4 3.0 
5.558 7.9 0.2 2.019 283 14.0 0.4 
2.908 1.993 68.5 1.0 1.123 912 81.2 1.3 
15.024 6.790 45.2 3.1 4.723 2.350 49.8 3.3 
352.774 215.730 100.0 U5.252 70.535 100.0 
231.¿i88 98.930 á2J 45.9 74.960 32 012 ¡£2 45.4 
Source: Ibid. ISíle 1, pace 270. Total & , 
except CLha fem Cbnsus 1980. insureds: 
occreqxniing adjustnents. 
#̂  i l the sickEss-nHÉemily progcaanE. 
B'. i l the pensicns pcpgcamE. 
1S79. 
Bsuudes -various mntps of insureds. 
f-1981. 
-', Estimâtes based cn l£^l ocjvetg^. 
#0 CÏDSS estinBtB. 
a' 1982. 
: Itapulaticn, based on CEIAEE, 
I cn a SLKvey afBwerBd by 
, adletin. 15:29 Jamaiy 1982 ani 17:33, 
countries and Statistics Ymttrirte and Repcrts. with 
198i, 




Qjartíty c f beriRñ'ts 
(in tixusands) 
tújsüy StTitp. 
& oamErDe & public 
servioe 




% f̂earfflrion dbsen^d i n 
oaàxyesc re. prewLous jear 
IntiBtry State 
& oanœacoe &pii)lic 
service 
irmxB 
1S50 188.2 43.2 145.0 
1551 223.9 68.6 155.3 - - - - -1952 259.6 92.9 166.7 15.9 35.4 7.3 _ 1953 300.8 119.3 181.5 - 15.9 28.4 8.9 -1954 391.0 187.5 233.5 - 30.0 57.2 12.1 -1955 473.0 247.1 225.9 - 21.0 31.8 1L.0 -1956 521.0 275.7 2tó.3 - 10.1 IL.6 8.6 -1957 565.9 302.0 263.9 - 8.6 9.5 7.6 -
m& 615.8 335.0 280.8 - 8.9 10.9 6.4 -1959 675.3 385.3 290.0 - 10.0 15.1 3.3 -1960 749.2 427.8 313.4 8.0 10.9 IL.0 8.1 -1961 821.6 461.2 341.4 19.0 9.7 7.8 8.9 -1962 888.7 501.9 366.0 3D.8 8.2 8.8 7.2 9.5 1963 870.2 547.6 394.9 27.7 9.2 9.1 7.9 33.1 
1964 1.013.6 596.2 389.6 27.8 4.4 8.9 -1.3 0.3 
1965 1.066.4 &&.2 406.7 35.5 7.2 7.7 4.9 1966 1.132.2 666.2 ¿1O6.8 57.2 4.2 3.7 - 61.1 1967 1.149.9 673.7 410.8 65.4 1.6 1,1 0.5 14.3 1968 1.255.7 71L.1 416.4 128.2 9.2 5.6 1.4 96.0 1969 1.301.6 ll^.l m6 131.3 3.7 5.0 1.0 4.8 1970 1.390.4 786.6 439.0 ia.8 6.8 5.3 4.4 22.7 
1971 1.422.6 799.8 4Í1.3 181.5 2.3 1.6 0.5 10.1 
1972 1.461.2 815.3 436.0 209.9 2.7 1.9 -1.2 15.6 1973 1.537.1 833.3 436.0 267.8 5.2 2.2 - 27.8 1974 1.596.6 844.8 436.6 315.2 3.9 1.4 0.1 17.7 
1975 1.691.0 866.9 437.7 370.2 6.2 4.9 0.2 17.4 1976 1.802.6 915.4 443.5 443.7 6.4 3.2 1.3 19.9 
19// 1.962.2 971.8 465.7 52Í.7 6.9 6.2 5.9 18.3 
1978 2.m.8 1.012.9 495.9 603.0 7.6 4.2 6.5 14.9 1979 2.225.6 1.035.6 519.1 670.9 5.4 2.2 4.7 IL.3 1980 2.312.4 1.087.6 5U..6 7D.2 5.2 5.0 4.3 6.3 
1961 2.428.5 1.134.1 562.2 732.2 3.7 4.3 5.8 2.6 1982 2.524.4 1.179.8 583.5 761.1 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.9 
1983 2.626.4 1.229.2 594.5 aU2.7 4.0 4.2 1.9 5.5 
1984 2.698.1 1.264.4 601.4 832.3 2.7 2.9 1.2 3.7 1985 2.759.4 1.290.5 606.6 862.4 2.3 2.1 0.9 3.8 
Source: Ffekhan, J., Colbert, L & ISLHTIL, E. , 1986, p a ^ 79. 
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T*le4 
REyE^Œ M) EXFBDIIŒE FER HN), ABGíNim. INMimOB Œ/iBIRftIiS Hm(X3CEER 1987.̂  
Oependerry rBt±> futxraaxe Systan toCaL 
RB^rœ Eiçendit. Balance Hevm» Bcpendit, Balance Re^«ue Bçerdtt. Balance 
1975 9.836 7.489 i.yn 268 1.951 -1.683 10.105 9.4!i0 664 
1976 8.545 5.600 2.9̂ 5 UO 1.477 -1.367 8.655 7.077 1.578 
1977 8.274 6.117 2.157 1% 1.528 -1.332 8.470 7.645 825 
1978 9.9!t2 7.999 1.243 441 2.081 -1.641 9.68? 10.061 -398 
1979 10.655 8.795 1.860 854 2.484 -1.630 U.509 11.279 230 
1980 IL.550 10.926 625 i . m 3.181 -2.066 12.666 14.107 -1.441 
19SL 4.824 10.327 -5.503 1.154 3.U1 -1.957 5.978 13.438 -i.m 
1982 3.615 7.170 -3.555 866 2.460 -1.59Í 4.481 9.629 -5.148 
1983 3.902 7.141 -3.238 825 2.9W -2.U5 4.727 10.08L -5.353 
198i 5.7L4 7.077 -1.364 799 2.976 -2.177 6.512 10.053 -3.541 
1985 8.121 8.3R3 -26? 597 2.850 -2.253 8.718 1L.233 -2.515 
198^/ 8.163 8.718 -555 615 3.070 -2.454 8.779 IL./88 -3.010 
Souiane: Sdultess, VfeltBr, "PœsentE y Riuro del R^nm de Jibllaciones y ItensicrEs" (Pœsant and Rrtxiœ of 
Etet±œiiErt; and Pensions Re^ne). Mineo 1988. 
^ RevaxE Itex^ ccntrihut±xis. Btpendituce thnx^ services. Deflated Ü T D C M Í I ocnsuna: price indsx. 
V EstiiHtE. 
Têtue 5 






Law Sys. 22.269/80 (ant.18.610/71) 17.3tJ5.918 57.50 
Provincial and municipal 
socÍ€ü. works 
(inclxades M.C.B.A. - Judicial Bcwer 
and the Nation's Congress) 4.005.160 13.30 
Nationsü. socieü. wotks 
Includes Armed and Security Forces 1.046.000 
Population covered 22.357.078 74.30 
Popalation not covered 7,739.̂ 840 25.̂ 0 
Ccuntry's total population 
INDEJC forecast for 1984 30.096.918 i§Q*ao 
Source; INOS. Planning Administraticai Offiœ. Aosiôtant Manager's ̂^̂^̂  
Organization and Information. Informtion Area. July 1985. 
Table 6 
ARGENTINA: DISTRIBüriC»í OF N.S.S.I.R.& P. BENEFICIARIES, BÏ AGE GROUPS 
(1981-1982/1986) 
Year Age % Age % Age % Age % Age 75 % Total 
0-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 & older 
1981 562.762 25.32 325.203 14.63 422.504 19.01 391.962 17.63 519.748 23.38 2.222.181 
1982 678.669 26.61 372.500 14.60 454.196 17.80 443.914 17.40 601.851 23.58 2.551.139 
1986 895.000 28.22 438.000 13.81 519.000 16.36 510.000 16.08 809.000 25.54 3.171.000 
Source; Colbert, L., 1988. Based on figures provided by the National Social Services Institute for 
Retirees and Pensicaiers (I.N.S.S.J. y P.) 
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Table 7 
ARGENTINA: BENEFITS AND MAZE POroiATION AGED 65 AND OIDER IN 1980 
fin thousandsl 
Jxjrisdictions Benefits for Ifeles Rate of 
males aged 65 & aged 65 Retirement 
older (NPS & & olderfe/ 
other regimes) â/ 
(1) (2) (1/2) 
FedexEü. Capital 160.5 161.6 104.3 
Buenos Aires 336.6 304.9 07.5 
Catamarca 4.0 6.6 60.6 
Córdoba 68.3 87.7 77.9 
Corrientes 9.1 18.9 48.1 
Chaco 8.8 16.8 52.4 
Chobol 3.1 5.5 56.4 
Entre Ríos 23.7 33.4 70.1 
Formosa 1.8 6.2 29.0 
Jujuy 4.4 7.7 57.1 
La Pairpa 5.7 7.9 72.2 
La Rioja 3.0 5.0 60.0 
Mendoza 27.0 34.1 79.4 
Misiones 4.8 12.0 40.0 
Neuquén 1.5 3.8 39.5 
Río Negro 3.9 8.6 45.3 
Salta 9.6 14.7 65.3 
San Juan 8.4 12.3 68.3 
San Luis 4.6 7.7 59.7 
Santa Cruz 1.2 2.1 57.1 
Santa Fe 94.7 103.7 91.3 
Santiago del Estero 8.6 19.5 44.1 
Tierra del Fuego 0.1 0.3 33.3 
Tucumán 20.3 27.0 75.2 
Country total 021.7 988.0 83.2 
Source; Feldman, (Solbert & Isuani, 1986, page 85. 
"15 









R s ^ S5 d S S 8 8 R ;^ ?i B 
in i>o CO v£> 00 j-j p 00 t-i iq CO oo' 
CO - <̂  00 g p jq <i g 
CM 
00 <t in ^ CM 
g in VO i-i tgi CM 
00 
r-~ in o s i o o o c o o o o r - i m c T s i n o 
in g in oo' oo' crj p «o' i"--
CM' VO 
es r ^ r o v o o o o M c M O o M i n vo 
in .-1 oovor-(incM<(-<í.ínn <f 
p: Sá 5̂  S3 S > ' R 5á ¿ ^ fe 
g r-i i-i oo' <)•' in" g cS r-i pv 
5! 
ODIE: 3XM.SmEmOJmŒKBLTmiCBMnCS, 1960-1987 








I^ssrve DeçecÚEcts Tbtal Total 
papn1at~îfn pqudarini 
1960 7.585 2.389 1.691 269 2.590 4.550 60.0 70.8 6.29 
1965 8.510 2.660 1.96̂  4 i l 3.064 5.469 64.3 73.8 4.44 
1970 9.368 2.932 2.217 614 3.523 6.354 67.8 75.6 3.61 
1973 9.8a 3.156 2.40Í 7D 3.91L 7.028 71.2 75.9 3.36 
1975 10.196 3.322 2.425 810 4.025 7.260 7L.2 73.0 2.99 
1980 n.ioi 3.788 2.337 1.071 4.070 7.478 67.3 61.3 2.18 
1987 12.520 4.327 2.196 702 4.180 7.078 56.5 50.7 3.12 
Source: Idan 1*18 10, p. 68. Based cn EIPC asía., "Devekgœrt of Social Security in latin Ajerica", SantLaga, Chilfi, 1985 and dEH/N Beçocts, 1986 
a d 1987. 
Table 10 
CHUE: SOCIAL SECURITY EXEENDHURE STEÜCIÜRE, 1970-1984 
(In percentages) 
PrxjyraiMie 1970 1975 1978 1980 1982̂ ^ 1984a/ 
1. Social secajril^ 43.7 48.1 46.3 52.8 56.4 58.5 
2. Health insurance 13.7 16.9 24.5 21.7 11.6 11.5 
3. Farfiily eillcwance 30.8 25.3 19.7 14.5 8.6 8.2 
4. Occc^ticml hazards 1.1 1.4 2.4 2.7 2.3 2.4 
5. ISienplqyinent insurance 0.6 1.0 2.1 2.3 3.1 1.7 
6. Other progrananes 10.1 7.3 5.0 6.0 9.6 9.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Frediani, R.O., 1987, p. 65. Based on data frcm Social Security Secretariat and CXMIAN. 
â/ 1982 and 1984 figures are net admininstrative œçenditures viiich in those years were 8.4% and 8.2%, 
re^jectively, of total ejçenditure. 
k8 
Table 11 
CmiE: SOCIAL SECURITY ÏUND INVESIMENT IN THE PRIVATE SOCIAL 
SECURITY SYSTEM 
(Deoeitiber 1986 - millicjns of pesos). 
Assets Amount Percentage 
invested 
1. Centrsil Bank & national 
treasury bonds 202.585 46.69 
2. Short-term mortgage bonds 110.773 25.53 
3. Term deposits 99.405 22.91 
4. Company stocks 16.314 3.76 
5. Bank debentures! and bonds 4.816 1.11 
Total 433.893 100.00 
A) Private instruments 214.994 49.55 
B) Public instruments 218.899 50.45 
Total 433.893 100.00 
Source; Idem Table 10, p. 67. Based on data frcm the Boletín Oficial de Ia 
Asociación Gremial de las AFP (AFP Official Trade Union Bulletin) 
No. 23, Santiago, Chile, January 1987. 
^ 9 
Table 12 
COSTA KECA: OOST OF SOCIAL SBCURTIY, 1960-1980 
(Millions of OTlones at current prices and peroentaaes) 
Social Security E>ç)enditureâ/ 
Years GDP Itotal 
e}<penditure 
by the central 
government 
Total Percentage of 
GDP Government 
exp&nãiture 
1961 2.929 419 56 1.9 13.4 
1965 3.928 649 90 2.3 13.9 
1970 6.524 1.192 349 5.3 29.3 
1975 16.805 3.544 1.104 6.6 31.2 
1979 34.584 8.658 2.764 8.0 31.9 
1980 41.405 10.436 3.716 9.0 35.6 
Source; Idem Table 1, p. 282. Based on: GDP 1961-1975: Anuario Estadístico de 
Costa Rica (Statistics Yearbook for Costa Rica), 1977; 1979-1980: IMF 
Intemational Financial Statistics, February, 1983. General 
Government Expenditure 1961-1975: Central Bank of Costa Rica, Cifra 
de Cuentas Nacionales de Costa Rica; 1957-1977 (Figures from 
National Accounts of Costa Rica; 1957-1977); 1979-1980: IMF, 
Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1982. Social Security 
E>ç)enditure 1961-1965:110, Ihe cost of social security; 1970-1975: 
CCSS, Anuario Estadístico. 1970-1976 (Statistics Yearbook, 1970-
1976) ; and Ministry of Health, Memoria 1982 (1982 Report) ; and 1979-
1980 IMF, op.cit. 




œSIAKKA: EaiOTCFCIOT»ŒKRMHaiGBraia^ 1973/«D 1979 
(In thajsands and pecoert:^) 
m m 
Aœas Mbddiç Vfaddigpap. % Mbddng Mbddrçpop. % 
Agâcultuce, stock 
raising, silviculture, 
h r t i i ç & fiLáiiiç 2 B 49 23.1 207 63 30.4 
iránes and qjarries 71 59 82.3 122 84 68.7 
Goretncticn 39 20 51.4 58 26 44.5 
Electricity, gas, vrafier, 
txar£|X3irtatixn & 
ocnnuiicatíons 30 21 68.1 42 30 71.9 
Oaimeroe & fínanciáL 
services 81 S2 63.3 B l 87 66.6 
Oamixiity, social & 
personal services 119 88 74.4 172 B7 79.9 
üiEpeciEied& 
seardilrig for wnk 31 - - B 
M 5© ^ 4 9 ^ 2̂ 3 42Z 5L5 
Souroe: Wan tsbls 1, p. 280. Based on: Vfeddrg pcpjlatUn: fiipMp^tja nadpnal de \TC&m, aapleo y (tesaiplfio. 
1979 (tfetLonal haœ survey, enplqynErtt and vraiplqjnEnt 1979). Insured: CCSS, Auario EstadLstJoo 
(Statistics Yeaitock), 1979. 
Inclirles only wg^ earners; since covms^ c£ self-enplcçred warters cud not b ^ i n urtdl 1974, tine first 
distributlon includes iall tinse insured but the second one excludes self-enplqyBd woiteEs. 
5 1 
Table 14 
œSTA KECA: DIFFERENCES IN YEARLY AVERAGE PENSIONS BBIWEEN 
INSURED GROUPS, 1982 
(Colones at current prices) 
Insured Groi^ Average Pension 
(oolcxies) 
Ratio§/ 
General (CCSS) 33.485 1.0 
Public works & 
transportation 61.494 1.8 
Bc3ucation 74.472 2.2 
Carnmunications 87.104 2.6 
Judicial 89.433 2.7 
Registrar 97.864 2.9 
Finance & Congress 129.322 3.9 
Source: Idem table 1, p. 281. Based on: Jorge Montt D., "Pensiones por 
jtíbilación en Costa Rica" (Retirement pensions in Costa Rica), 
Heredia, 1982; and interviews with the author in San Jose, July 
1983, in the various instituticais insured. 
â/ Using CCSS as a basis (1.0) 
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Table 15 
EŒÎRDGiRl DîSURED UBS mmumŒ 1970-1986 
Year Affiliates Etesisiariers Poasanbs lïmaxea 
populatian 
1970 308.347 44.957 4.093 357.397 
1971 328.658 47.918 4.093 380.669 
1972 349.944 51.022 4.093 405.059 
1973 372.205 54.267 5.419 431.891 
1974 395.441 57.655 16.344 469.440 
1975 419.652 61.185 44.291 525.128 
1976 444.839 64.858 54.496 564.193 
1977 471.000 67.071 70.495 608.566 
1978 498.137 71.681 72.796 624.614 
1979 526.248 72.966 78.694 677.90» 
1980 555.335 80.599 107.900 743.834 
1981 585.397 87.288 108.522 781.207 
1982 598.986 91.572 120.516 811.074 
1983 623.460 96.373 202.345 922.178 
1984 648.224 102.883 305.822 1.056»929 
1985 715.396 106.452 389.806 1.211.654 
1986 750.334 109.827 434.034 1.254.195 
Source; Ribadeneira et al, 1988.. BStaea on; IBSS Boletines Bstadistioos (lESS 
Statistics Bulletins), I, II, H, IV; Mamaria Institucional 1986 
(1986 Institutional Report). Prepared by üDIíCM. 
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Table 16 
EOJAIXiR: INSURED PORJIATION SITOdURE AND M3RKIN8 FOHJIATICN 






Primary 319.569 29.31 1.217.686 39.93 
Secxandary 179.267 16.44 517.082 16.95 
Tertiary 461.398 42.32 1.170.091 38.37 
Other 27.022 2.49 144.692 4.75 
Pension 102.883 9.44 - -
Total 1.090.139 100.00 3.049.551 100.00 
Source; Idem Table 15. Based on; INBC, lESS. Prepared hy UDIPCM. 
5 -̂
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Table 18 
R: TRENDS IN MEDICAL SERVICE 
Years Revenue Expenditure Différencies % Saving 
1980 2.418 2.472 (54) -2.23 
1981 2.884 2.658 226 7.84 
1982 3.338 3.424 (86) -2.58 
1983 3.847 4.178 (331) -8.60 
1984 4.999 5.001 (2) -0.04 
1985 6.492 6.670 (178) -2.74 
1986 8.440 10.679 (2.239) -26.53 
1987 9.846 14.346 (4.500) -45.70 
Total 42.264 49.428 (7 164) -16.95 
Source; Idem Table 15, Annex 6. Based on; Aspectos Eooncaxdooe y financieros 
del I.E.S.S. (I.E.S.S. Financieú. and eccxKBdc aspects), E08.87. 
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APPENDIX II: 
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF OLD AGE PENSIONS PROGRAMMES 
IN THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 1/ 
Prepared on the basis of U.S: Department of Health 
Human Services (1986) 
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A. HIGH GROUP 
A.l) ARGENTINA: 
Coverage: Wage earners and self-employed workers. Separate 
systems for private and public employees (same cover-
age) and self-employed workers. Voluntary a f f i l i a t i o n 
for non-workers under age 55. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured workers: 10% of wages. Self employed 
workers 15% over income scale. In agriculture 
this i s replaced by a sales tax on agricultural 
production. Employers: 11% of nominal salary. 
Government: pays as employer and covers the 
system's deficits. 
Requirements: 
Age 60 for men and 55 for women (65 and 60 
for self employed workers), with 30 years of 
service and 15 years of contributions. 
Insured workers may substitute 2 years after 
retirement age, for one year of contribut-
ions. Retirement age as well as required 
minimum employment and contributions, is 
reduced by 5 years for hazardous or unhealthy 
occupations. Pensions reduced, age 65 (70 
for self employed workers) after ten years 
of work of which at least 5 shall be within 
the last 8 years. Monthly pensions are 
reduced i f the pensioner continues in paid 
employment. 
Benefits: 70% of adjusted wage average, of the three years with 
the highest income out of the ten last years, plus 
extra income for differed retirement: 8% after 3 
years, 10% after 4 years, 12% after 5 years, with a 
maximum benefit of 82%. Self employed workers, 100% of 
income average. Pension adjustments in general go by 
the wage variation index for changes of 10% or more. 
There i s a minimum pension, with the amount set by the 
application authority. Service for the poor at age 70. 
A.2) BRAZIL: 
Coverage: Industry and commerce, domestic service and self emp-
loyed workers (in urban areas). Voluntary coverage for 
the clergy. Special systems for students, public 
employees, rural workers and employers. 
60 
Insured worker: 8.5% to 10% of wage, plus 0.75% 
of bonus. Self employed worker: 19.2% of Income. 
Rural workers: do not contribute. Rural 
employers, 1.44% of previous year's production, 
plus 0.72% of the value of fallow land. Employer: 
10% of nominal wage, plus 1.5% of bonus. Urban 
employers also contribute with 2.4% of nominal 
wage to rural workers social security programmes 
and rural producers contribute 2% of the value of 
exploitation production. Government: various 
t a x e s , e s p e c i a l l y d e s t i n e d to finance 
administrative expenditures and to cover deficits. 
Requirements : 
Age 65 for men and 60 for women, in addition 
to 60 months of contributions; age 50 i f i t 
involves between 15 and 25 years in hazardous 
jobs. Pensions for prolonged services: 30 
years of service. Rural workers: age 65 and 
3 years of contributions; rural employers, 
age 65 and 1 year of contributions. 
Retirement not mandatory. Assistance for 
indigents: age 70 for the poor or invalids 
with at least one year of remunerated 
employment. 
Benefits: For income less than 10 times minimum wage, 70% income 
average in the last 36 months plus 1% of wage average 
for each year of contribution, up to 95% wage average. 
For wages equal to 10 times the minimum wage or more, 
70% of the wage average for each year of contribution 
plus 1/30 of wage average for each year of contribut-
ions, up to 80% of wage average. For rural workers, 
50% of the highest minimum of the country, for rural 
employers, 90% of the average of the monthly base 
contribution value, during the last 36 months. Pen-
sions for prolonged service: 80% of wage average, plus 
3% per year over the 30 year limit, up to 95% of wage 
average, with 30 years service. Minimum benefit: 90% 
of the regional minimum wage. Pensions are automatic-
a l l y adjusted biannually according to changes in pric-
es. Indigent allotment: half of the highest minimum 
wage of the country. 
A.3) CHILE: 
Coverage: Old Svstem:Workers, self employed workers and wage 
earning employees in the private sector. Special 
systems for railroad and maritime workers, longshore-




New System; Workers and wage earning employees; mandatory 
coverage. Self employed workers; voluntary coverage. 
Source of 
Funds; Old Svstem;Insured; workers, 18.89% of wage; 
wage earning employees, 19.94% of wage. 
Employers; do not contribute. Government; 
s p e c i a l subsidies necessary for financing 
programmes. 
New System;Insured; minimum for old age 
pension, 10% of wage. Employer; does not 
contribute. Government: special subsidies 
for guaranteeing minimum pension. 
Requirements : 
Old System ; Workers : for men age 65 and with 
800 weeks of contributions and 50% of weeks 
as of i n i t i a l coverage. For women aged 60 
and with 500 weeks of contributions. 
Employer; for men age 65 and 35 years of 
contributions; for women age 60 and 35 years 
of contributions. 
New System; Age 65 (men) and 60 (women), 20 years of 
contributions (in the transition, 12 months of contrib-
utions in the last 5 years prior to November 1980) . 
Retirement may occur before minimum age i f the pension 
is equal to 70% of the average of the last 10 years of 
wages and is at least equal to the minimum old age 
pension. 
Benefits: Old System: Workers: 50% of basic wage (monthly 
average of the last 5 years, the f i r s t 2 years adjusted 
due to wage variation) , plus 1% of wages for each 50 
weeks of contributions over 500 weeks. Minimum, 85% of 
minimum industrial wage; maximum, 70% of basic wage. 
10% increases for each 150 weeks of contributions. 
Wage earners: 1/35 of basic wage for each year of 
contribution. For women with over 19 years of contrib-
utions, increases of 1/35 of basic wage per dependent 
child, for women with over 19 years of contributions. 
100% maximum of basic salary. Automatic annual adjust-
ment for changes above 15% of the price index. 
New Svstem; Beneficiaries' contributions plus acc-
rued interest. Minimum pension guaranteed by the 
government. Upon retiring, the insured can make with-
drawals from his account, regulated to guarantee income 
throughout his l i f e expectance; contract l i f e annuit-
ies with private insurance companies. 
A.4) CUBA; 
Coverage: Employees, members of production cooperatives, self 
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employed workers and li b e r a l professionals. Special 
system for members of the Armed Forces. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: does not contribute. (Own account contribute 
10% of income) . Employer: 10% of nominal wage. 
Government: covers deficits and also contributes as 
employer. 
Requirements : 
Age 60 for men or 55 for women, with 25 years of work 
(55 and 50, i f the last 12 years or 75% of the work 
were in hazardous employment). Pensions reduced at age 
65 for men and 60 for women with 15 years of work. Non 
mandatory retirement, but current income cannot exceed 
past income. 
Benefits: 50% of income average (when i t exceeds a set limit the 
percentage i s reduced) of the 5 greatest years within 
the last 10, plus 1% of wage for each year of employ-
ment over 25 years (1.5% i f i t involved hazardous 
work). Increases of 1.5% to 4% of wage for each one of 
the 5 years for differed pension, and 1% yearly from 
there on in. Pensions reduced, 40% wage average, plus 
1% of the wage for each year of work over 15 years. 
Minimum pension, depending on the wage average level 
and on the number of years of work. Maximum: 90% of 
wage salary. 
A.5) URUGUAY: 
Coverage: Employees and self employed workers. Separate systems 
for bank employees, court clerks and li b e r a l profes-
sionals. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 13% to 16% of wages in industry and commerce; 
rural workers, 9% of wages; public employees, 13%. 
Employers: 10% to 14% of nominal salary in industry 
and commerce; rural workers, 10% of nominal salary; 
public employment, 15%. Government; various taxes for 
financing deficits. 
Requirements : 
Age 60 for men and 55 for women and 30 years of con-
tributions. Additional years of service are accredited 
for hazardous occupations and teaching. Reduced pen-
sions, at age 70 for men and 65 for women and 10 years 
of service. Early pensions exist for politicians and 
judges (20 years of service with the last 3 years in 
judi c i a l or p o l i t i c a l office) and teachers (25 years of 
service or age 50 and 20 years of service). 
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Benefits: 60 % for men or 65% for women of wage average in the 
last 4 years plus 5% for each additional 5 years of 
work, up to 75% of wage. Minimum pension: 85% of 
minimum salary on retirement day. Maximum pension: 7 
minimum wages. (Maximum for early pensions: 15 times 
minimum salary). Reduced and early pensions: 40% of 
wage average of the last 4 years, plus 1% of the wage 
for each year of service, up to 70% of wage. Teachers, 
50% of wage average in the last 4 years, plus 2% of 
wage per year of service over 20 years, up to 70% of 
wage. Pensions are adjusted following variations in 
wages. Allowance for indigents: are paid to needy 
persons, 70 years and older. 
A.6) COSTA RICA: 
Coverage: Public and private sector employees. Voluntary cover-
age for self employed workers. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 2.5% of wage. Self employed workers pay 
7.25% of income. Employers: 4.75% of nominal salary. 
Government: 0.25% of total guaranteed income. 
Requirements: 
Age 57 for men with 408 months of contributions or 65 
years with 120 months. For each month over age 57, the 
number of months of contribution required i s reduced by 
3. For women age 55 is required with 408 months of 
contributions, or 65 with 120 months. For each month 
over age 55 and up to age 58, the number of months 
required i s reduced by 1; for each month over age 58 
and up to age 65, months required are reduced by 3. 
Retirement from occupation covered i s not mandatory. 
Benefits: 40% of average of 48 highest monthly wages, within the 
last 10 years of contributions. Basic benefit increas-
es by 1/8 of 1% of income average for each month of 
contribution. Benefits increase by 20% per wife and 
children; or 10% in the case that only one of these 
dependents exists. A 0.5% increase in pension for 
each month of differred retirement, over the age limit. 
Pensions are adjusted periodically. There i s a minimum 
and maximum pension. 
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B. INTERMEDIATE GROUP 
B.l) PANAMA 
Coverage: Wage earners and domestic workers (self employed wor-
kers can be voluntarily incorporated). Public employ-
ees are covered under the general and special systems. 
Excluded: agricultural workers employed under 6 months 
of the year and family workers. Occasional and seas-
onal workers are covered by the subsequent regulation. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 6.25% of income. Employer: 2.75% of nominal 
wage. Government: does not contribute. 
Requirements : 
Age 60 for men or 55 for women. Reduced pensions up to 
5 years prior. 180 months of contributions. Pensions 
reduced as a function of income. 
Benefits: 60% income average during the highest 3 to 5 years in 
the last 15 years of contributions (less years are 
averaged for prolonged professions), plus 1.25% of 
income for each 12 months of contributions between 120 
and 240 months, 1.5% over 240 months and 2% of income 
for each 12 months of contributions beyond the adequate 
retirement age. Supplements for dependents (at normal 
retirement age); monthly sums of money, per wife, 
children under age 18 (no age limit i f they are handic-
apped) ; with a maximum limit for benefit contribution. 
Minimum and maximum pension, at a set sum of money. 
Pension plus supplements for dependents shall not 
exceed 100% of income used as a pension base. Reduced 
pension: ordinary pension, including minimum and 
maximum pension, being reduced by 3.5% for each year of 
early retirement. Old age subsidy: one month of 
pension for each 6 months of contributions, i f ine l i g -
ible for taxable pension. Pensions are adjusted on an 
ad hoc basis. 
B.2) MEXICO: 
Coverage: Wage earners, member of production, agricultural and 
credit cooperatives. Coverage began to be extended 
gradually to rural areas. Coverage has been extended 
by decree to agricultural workers, small farmers, small 
businessmen, community farmers, silvicultivators, 
commercial and industrial cooperatives, self employed 
workers, family and domestic workers. A l l those not 
covered can a f f i l i a t e themselves voluntarily. Special 
systems for o i l workers and public employees. 
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Source of 
Funds: Insured: 1.5% of income average. Employer: 3.75% of 
nominal salary. Government: 20% of employer contrib-
ution (for workers a f f i l i a t e d through production, 
agricultural and credit cooperatives, the organization 
pays 50% and the Federal Government the remaining 50% 
of the employer-employee contribution). Maximum income 
for contribution and benefits: 10 times the minimum 
wage in the Federal District. Minimum: 1 minimum wage 
of the region. Special contribution rates for volun-
tary a f f i l i a t e s . 
Requirements: 
Age 65 (75% to 95% of complete pension at age 60-64, i f 
involuntarily unemployed), 500 weeks of contributions. 
Retirement from employment covered i s not mandatory i f 
the new work is with a different employer, and after 6 
months of waiting. 
Benefits: 35% of average income during the last 250 weeks of 
contributions, plus 1.25% of income per year of cont-
ributions beyond 500 weeks. Pensions are increased by 
15% i f there are no dependents. Supplement per depen-
dent: 15% of the pension for the wife, 10% of the 
pension per child under age 16 (25 i f he/she is a 
student and no age limits for handicapped) . If there 
i s no wife or kids, 10% for each dependent father or 
mother. Maximum pension: 100% of income with 2000 
weeks of contribution or more. 
B.3) PERU: 
Coverage: Wage earners, including public employees, employees in 
cooperative or worker owned companies, artists and 
domestic workers. Voluntary a f f i l i a t i o n for self 
employed workers and for those workers who abandon 
activi t i e s covered. 
Requirements : 
General system (for men born after July 1, 1931, or 
women born after July 1, 1936, self employed workers 
and new insured workers after May 1973): age 60 (men) 
or 55 (women) , with 15 and 13 years of contribution, 
respectively (pensions reduced i f have less than con-
tributions) . Special system (all others insured): age 
60 (men) or 55 (women) and 5 years of contributions. 
Complete pension: 5 years earlier for hazardous or 
arduous occupations. Retirement anticipated at age 55 
for d i s b i l i t y unrelated to employment or after 30 years 
of contributions (men) or 50 years after 25 years of 
contributions (women). Mandatory retirement. 
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Benefits: General system: 50% of income average in the last 3, 4 
or 5 years (whichever i s more), plus 2% yearly over 15 
years (men) or 2.5% yearly beyond 13 years (women). 
Special increase of 1.2% (men) or 1.5% (women) for each 
additional year of contributions. Minimum, 3 times the 
minimum salary in Lima. Maximum, 80% of ten times the 
minimum salary. Supplements for dependents: 2% to 10% 
of income per spouse and 2% to 5% per child. Maximum, 
80% of total benefit. Reduced pension: 1/30 (men) or 
1/25 (women) years of contribution. Automatic quar-
terly adjustment of pensions, according to changes in 
the cost of living. 
B.2) COLOMBIA 
Coverage: Wage earners in industry and commerce in the majority 
of regions and self employed workers. Excluding: 
agricultural and domestic workers and temporary employ-
ment. Special systems for national and local level 
public employees (teachers, railroad workers, military 
officers and national police). 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 1.5% of income, according to type of wage. 
Employer: 3% of nominal wage, according to type of 
nominal wage. Government: contributes to extend the 
system. Minimum income for contributions and benefits: 
minimum legal salary; maximum: 22 times minimum legal 
salary. 
Requirements : 
Age 60 for men and 55 for women; 500 weeks of contrib-
utions in the last 20 years. Early retirement in 
certain occupations with 750 weeks of contributions, or 
pensions for prolonged services i f have over 1000 weeks 
of contributions (except i f born prior to 1919/22). 
Pensions reduced when current income plus pension 
exceeds previous income. 
Benefits: 45% of income average during the last 3 years, plus 
1.2% income increases for each 50 weeks of contribut-
ions over 500 weeks. In the case of insufficient 
contribution payments is made which is equivalent to 1 
month of pension for each 25 weeks of contributions 
(with a minimum of 100 weeks of contributions) . Sub-
sidies for dependents: wife aged 60 or handicapped, 
14% of minimum pension. For each dependent child under 
age 16 (18 i f a student and without age limit i f hand-
icapped) , 7% of minimum pension. Maximum subsidy: 42% 
of minimum pension. Yearly minimum pension: minimum 
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wage; maximum, 22 times minimum salary. Yearly adjus-
tment of pensions due to changes in wage levels. 
B.5) BOLIVIA 
Coverage: Wage earners in industry, commerce, mining and govern-
ment services. Voluntary coverage for self employed 
workers. Excluded: Agricultural and domestic workers, 
craftsmen, conductors, businessmen and occasional 
workers. Special systems for bank employees and mi l i t -
ary personnel. (17 funds complement the compulsory 
programme for individual categories of workers, admin-
istered separately by unions, under the direction and 
coordination of the Social Security Institute. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 1.5% of income. Employer: 1.5% of nominal 
wage. Government: 1.5% of insured wages. There 
exists a maximum income amount for contributions and 
benefits. 
Requirements : 
Age 55 for men or 50 for women (five years earlier for 
hazardous occupations), with 180 months of contribut-
ions. Reduced pensions: age 50 men or 45 women, 
following prolonged and involuntary unemployment. 
Benefits: 30% of income average in the last 12 months of contrib-
utions plus 2% increases in guaranteed income, for each 
12 months of contributions beyond 180 months. Maximum 
and minimum pension. Reduced old age pension, 8% for 
each year of early retirement. Pensions are adjusted 
automatically on a yearly basis due to changes in 
wages. Old age subsidies: 1 monthly pension for each 
6 months of contributions (or fraction thereof), i f 
have 24 months of contributions and i s not eligible to 
obtain other pensions. 
B.6) ECUADOR 
Coverage: Wage earners in industry and commerce, banks, public 
employees, self employed workers, professionals, domes-
t i c workers and clergy. Coverage for agricultural 
workers has been gradually extended geographically. 
Excluded: temporary workers, family work and home-
based workers, also foreign employees for periods not 
exceeding 1 year. Special programmes for craftsmen. 
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Source of 
Funds: 5% of income, plus 1% for l i f e insurance, 1% for 13th 
and 14th yearly payment combined and 0.35% per agricul-
tural programme. Employer: 6.35% of nominal salary, 
including 0.35% for agricultural programme. Govern-
ment: yearly subsidy. There is no maximum income 
limit for contributions. There is for benefits. 
Minimum for contributions: legal minimum salary. 
Requirements : 
Age 55 and 360 months of contributions or at any age 
with 429 months of contributions; beginning at age 60, 
the minimum number of monthly contributions is reduced. 
Reduced pensions at age 45 with 300 months of contrib-
utions and 6 months unemployed. 
Benefits: 43.75% of income average during the highest 5 years 
(not necessarily consecutive), plus 1.25% increases in 
income average per year of contributions beyond 5 
years. After 40 years, 100% of income average. Min-
imum pension same as legal minimum wage. Pensions are 
adjusted according to changes in cost of l i v i n g . 
B.7) PARAGUAY 
Coverage: Wage earners. Special systems for railroad workers, 
bank and public employees. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 9.5% of income. Pensioners, 5% of pensions. 
Employer: 16.5% of nominal wage. Government: 1.5% of 
income. Minimum income for contributions: minimum 
salary. These contributions also finance benefits for 
sickness, maternity and work accidents. 
Requirements : 
Age 60 with 15 years of contributions, or age 55 with 
20 years cf contributions. Retirement i s not mandat-
ory! Pensions are paid abroad. Supplement for ordin-
ary retirement: age 60 with 20 years of contributions 
or age 55 with 25 years of contributions. 
Benefits: 42.5% of average income during the last 3 years. 
Pensions increased 1.5% per 50 weeks of contributions 
over 750 weeks. Mandatory supplement for ordinary 
retirement: 50% of income average during the last 3 
years. The combination of pension and supplements may 




Coverage: Wage earners in private and public employment (members 
of production and service cooperatives, domestic wor-
kers and taxi drivers covered by special regulations) . 
Excluded: temporary and occasional workers and self 
employed workers. Coverage for public employees has 
been gradually extended to different regions. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 2% of income. Employer: 2.75% of nominal 
wage. Government: at least 1.5% of total tax revenue, 
to cover administrative costs (in addition to contrib-
utions as employer, for public employees). A monthly 
amount i s fixed as maximum income for contributions and 
benefits. 
Requirements : 
Age 60 for men and 55 for women; lower ages for work 
which i s hazardous to health or arduous. 750 weeks of 
contributions (reduced to a minimum of 250 weeks for 
old workers in the new regions covered). Retirement id 
not obligatory. 
Benefits: A sum of money i s determined monthly plus 30% of income 
average in the last 5 or 10 years (whichever i s great-
er) . Increases of 1% of income, for each 50 weeks of 
contributions beyond 750 weeks. Minimum pension: 40% 
of income, but subject to a minimum amount of money. 
Increases for differed pension: 5% of the pension per 
year beyond pensionable age. Old age subsidy: 10% of 
total income guaranteed, i f inelegible for pension, but 
with at least 100 weeks of contributions during the 
last 4 years. Occasional adjustments of benefits for 
changes in prices and salaries. 
C. LOW GROUP 
C.l) DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 
Coverage: Wage earners, domestic workers and wage earners in 
State companies, aged between 14-59 (64 in some cases). 
Excluded: service workers with incomes over a set 
limit, self-employed worker, family work and low income 
apprentices. Special system for public workers. 
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Source of 
Funds: Insured: 2.5% of income according to 15 wage levels. 
Employer: 7% of nominal wage, according to type of 
salary. Government: 2.5% of total taxable income, and 
cover def i c i t s . Maximum income for contributions and 
benefits. These contributions also finance sick and 
maternity benefits. 
Requirements : 
Age 60 (65 i f insured after age 45) and 800 weeks of 
contributions (pensions reduced i f between 400 and 799 
weeks). Retirement from covered work is mandatory at 
age 65. 
Benefits: 40% of income average in the last 4 years, plus 2% of 
income per 100 weeks of contributions (or fraction 
thereof) beyond 800 weeks. Additional benefits: 5% 
per wife, children under age 14 or dependent relatives 
over 60 i f not receiving pension. Minimum pension. 
Maximum, 70% of income. Reduced pensions: percentage 
of total pension in proportion to weeks of contribut-
ion. Reimbursement of contributions: payment of 
employee contributions, plus 5% interest, i f have 
between 1 and 399 weeks of contributions. 
C.2) GUATEMALA: 
Coverage: Wage earners, including agricultural workers and cer-
tain public employees. Special system for other public 
employees. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 1.5% of income. Employer: 3% of nominal 
wage. Government: 25% of cost of benefits paid, as 
well as contributing as employer and for pensions under 
transition. Voluntary continuation of coverage: 4.5%. 
Requirements : 
Age 65 (or 60 i f unemployed for 12 months or i f contin-
uation of work is detrimental to worker's health) with 
180 months of contributions. Retirement i s mandatory 
from the last employment. Reduced pension i f income 
plus pension exceed basic salary. 
Benefits: 40% of monthly income average during the last 5 years 
of contributions, plus increases of 0.5% of income for 
every 4 months of contributions beyond 120 months. 
Subsidies for dependent persons: 10% of pension for 
wife or invalid spouse, and for each child under age 18 
or handicapped. Maximum and minimum pension. 
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C.3) EL SALVADOR: 
Coverage: Wage earners in industry and commerce. Excluded: 
self-employed workers, also farm, domestic and occa-
sional workers. Special system for public employees. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 1% of income. Those receiving sick, matern-
it y and work accident benefits, contribute in addition 
2% of benefits. Employer: 0.5% of income. Maximum 
and minimum income for contributions and benefits. 
Requirements : 
Age 65 (men) or 60 (women) with 750 weeks of contribut-
ions. Pensions reduced up to 5 years prior to the age 
required, with 1,250 weeks of contributions, i f unemp-
loyed during the last 12 months or 50% disabilitated 
due to health hazardous or psychically debilitating 
occupation. Mandatory retirement. Paid overseas. Old 
age subsidies: age 65 (men) or 60 (women), with at 
least 250 weeks of contributions and unemployment 
during the last 3 months. 
Benefits: 40% monthly income average, plus 1% of income per 50 
weeks of contributions beyond 150 weeks. There is a 
minimum benefit. 3% increase in income, for every 50 
weeks beyond retirement age. Child allowance: an 
amount i s set for every dependent child, under age 16 
(21 i f a student) or handicapped. Maximum pension: 
90% of monthly income average. Reduced pension: 30% 
of monthly income average, plus 1% of income for every 
50 weeks of contributions beyond 150 weeks. Old age 
subsidy: total sum equal to 50% of monthly income for 
every 50 weeks of contributions or fraction thereof. 
Pensions are adjusted due to variations in cost of 
li v i n g . 
N.2) NICARAGUA: 
Coverage: A l l persons receiving remuneration for salaried work or 
services. Excluded: domestic workers, temporary 
agricultural workers who work for employers who do not 
have a minimum of 5 permanent employees. Special 
systems for miners and those who have rendered services 
for the country. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 1.75% of income. Employer: 3.5% of nominal 
wage. Government: 0.25% of income (plus contribution 
as employer, for public employees). There is no max-
imum income limit for contributions. 
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Requirements : 
Age 60 (miners, teachers, physically and mentally 
handicapped, age 55), 750 weeks of contributions. 
Temporary pensions i f have under 750 weeks of contrib-
utions. If enter after age 45, contributions are for 
half of weeks from i n i t i a l contribution up to retire-
ment age, with a minimum of 250 weeks. Retirement is 
mandatory from work covered at age 70. 
Benefits: 40% (45% i f less than 20 minimum salaries) of income 
average during the last 3 years, plus 1.36% (1.591% i f 
income average i s below 20 minimum salaries) for each 
additional year of contribution. In addition, 1% of 
income for every year of work beyond age 60. Subsidies 
for dependent persons: 15% of pension for wife or 
common-law partner, 10% for each child under age 15 (21 
i f a student, no limit i f handicapped), 10% for non-
insured relatives over age 60 or invalid. Temporary 
pensions: 1 month for each year of contribution, with 
a minimum of 4 months. Maximum pension: 80% of income 
i f i t exceeds twice minimum wage; no limit i f under; 
100% i f have persons under one's care. Periodical 
adjustment of benefits for changes in prices, depending 
on financial conditions. 
C.5) HONDURAS: 
Coverage: Public and private company employees, also profession-
als and self employed workers. Excluded: Domestic, 
occasional, agricultural (except those whose employers 
have more than 10 permanent workers in their pay) . 
Special systems for teachers and public employees. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 1% of income. Employer: 2% of nominal 
salary. Minimum and maximum income amounts set for 
contributions. 
Requirements : 
Age 65 for men and 60 for women, 180 months of cont-
ributions. Retirement from employment covered by the 
system i s mandatory. 
Benefits: 40% of monthly income average, plus 1% increases of 
income for every 12 months of contributions beyond 60 
months. Increases for work beyond age 65 for men and 
60 for women: 3% of monthly basic income for each year 
of contribution. Minimum pension: 50% of income; 
maximum: 80%. Contributions reimbursed i f not e l i g -
ible to receive pensions. 
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C.6) HAITI: 
Coverage: Wage earners in industry, commerce and agriculture. 
Exclxided: non-remunerated family work, members of 
religious orders and foreign diplomats. Special sys-
tems for public employees. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: according to income level (2% for the lowest 
and 3%, 4% or 6% for higher incomes). Employer: idem. 
Government: covers def i c i t s . 
Requirements : 
Age 55 and 20 years of contributions. 
Benefits: 1/3 of income average during the last 10 years. Reim-
bursement of contributions plus interest, i f ineligible 
for pension. 
D. NGN HISPANIC CARIBBEAN 
D.l) ANTIGUA BARBUDA: 
Coverage: Employees between age 16 and 59. Not included are 
family or sporadic employment with wages under a set 
amount. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 3% of wage. Employer: 5% of nominal wage. 
Government: does not contribute funds. There i s a 
maximum limit for calculatable income for benefits. 
Requirements : 
Age 60 and 500 weeks of contributions (reduced pensions 
with between 156 and 500 weeks). Old age subsidy: age 
60 with 26 weeks minimum contribution. 
Benefits: 25% of income covered, plus 1% of income for every 50 
weeks of contributions, beyond 500 weeks. 
D.2) BAHAMAS: 
Coverage: Employees and self employer workers. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 1.7% of wages below a fixed amount, 3.4% of 
additional wages. Self employed workers: 8.8% (i n c l -
74 
udes 2% for work accident programmes). Employer: 7.1% 
of nominal wage for wages under a set amount, 5.4% for 
the remainder, 2% of employer contribution i s destined 
for work accident benefits. Government: does not 
contribute funds, except for indigent allowance in 
force from before October 1984. There is a maximum 
limit for contributions destined to obtain benefits. 
Requirements : 
Age 65 with 750 seeks of paid or accredited contribut-
ions. Minimum requirements: 150 weeks of paid contri-
butions. Employees over age 35 in 1974 (self employed 
workers over age 35 in 1976) receive special credit of 
25 weeks per year over age 35, up to a maximum of 600 
credits, provided that 150 contributions are paid 
during the f i r s t 3 years that the Programme under 
operation i s in effect. Mandatory retirement. 
Benefits: 40% of insured salary with 750 paid or accredited 
contributions. 1% increase in insured salary for every 
50 contributions over 750 paid or accredited, up to a 
maximum of 60%. Between 15% and 38% of insured salary, 
i f hsive between 150 and 749 paid or accredited contrib-
utions. Indigent allowance: for retired workers, age 
65 or over, who are not enrolled in the national insur-
ance system. 
D.3) BARBADOS 
Coverage: Employees, including public employees and self employed 
workers. Excluded: temporary employment, family work 
and foreign diplomats. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 3% of income; self employed workers, 6%. 
Employer: 3% of nominal wage. Government: does not 
allocate funds (pays total cost of subsidies). There 
are minimum and maximum taxable incomes. 
Requirements : 
Age 65, 500 weeks of accredited contributions with at 
least 150 weeks paid. In transition, 25 weeks accred-
ited for every year after age 45, with a maximum of 350 
weeks of accredited contributions. 
Benefits: 50% of income average of 3 highest years among the last 
15 (less i f contributed in less years) plus 1% of total 
income over 500 weeks of accredited contributions. 
Maximum benefit: 60% of income average. Minimum: set 
quantity. Old age subsidy: total contribution equal 
to 6 weekly wages for every 50 weeks of contributions, 
i f inelegible for pension. 
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D.4) BELIZE 
Coverage: Wage earners between age 15 and 64, including public 
employees. Excluded: temporary workers, family wor-
kers, domestic employees who work under 24 hours weekly 
and military personnel. Voluntary coverage extension 
for certain workers who enter the work force as self 
employed workers. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: weekly contributions according to four wage 
levels. Employers: contributions according to the 
four wage levels. Government: as employer. Also 
covers deficits. 
Requirements : 
Age 60 with 500 weeks of contributions (150 paid). 
Mandatory retirement. 
Benefits: 30% of weekly income average, based on the 3 highest 
income years within the last 15, plus 2% of income for 
every 50 weeks of contributions over 500 weeks, up to 
750 weeks and 1% of income for every 50 weeks of cont-
ributions over 750. Maximum benefit: 60% of income 
average. 
D.5) BERMUDA 
Coverage: Individual employees and workers, over age 16, except 
temporary or very low income workers. Excluded are: 
those who are not regular residents, unless occupied in 
salaried employment for over 13 consecutive weeks. 
Insurance is voluntary for ex-covered workers. 
Source of 
Funds: Contributions differ for wage earners, self employed 
workers and employers. They are set as a fixed weekly 
amount. Government: does not contribute. 
Requirements : 
Age 65 and 250 weeks of contributions with 50 weeks of 
contribution for every year of insurance (pensions 
reduced i f have between 25 and 49 weeks). Retirement 
not mandatory. Pensions not taxable: age 65 and 10 
consecutive years of immediate residence prior to 
application and not qualified for regular old age 
pensions. 
Benefits: Stipulated in money, plus allowances for every 26 weeks 
of contributions over 250. Pensions reduced for cases 
of lower periods of contributions. Lower amounts for 
non-taxable pensions and minimum pension for income 
under a stipulated amount. One-time subsidy for per-
sons ineligible to access pensions. 
D.6) GRENADA 
Coverage: Wage earners between ages 16 and 59, including public 
employees. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 4% of income. Employer: 4% of covered 
salary. Government does not contribute. There is a 
maximum taxable income. 
Requirements : 
Age 60, 500 weeks of contributions, with at least 150 
weeks paid. Old age subsidies: age 60, must be i n e l -
igible for pensions, with at least 50 weeks paid or 
accredited contributions. 
Benefits: 30% income average, plus 1% of income for every 50 
weeks of contributions, over 500. Old age subsidies: 
total amount equivalent to 5 times weekly income aver-
age, for every 50 weeks of contributions. 
D.7) GUYANA: 
Coverage: Employees between age 16 and 59 in the public and 
private sector and self employed workers. Coverage 
voluntary for those previously insured. Excluded are: 
employees with wages under a weekly minimum, occasional 
workers and family work. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 4.9% of income, according to 10 wage levels. 
Self employed workers: 10.5% of income. No contribut-
ions beyond age 60. Employer: 7.4% of nominal wage, 
in accordance with the 10 levels of wages. Workers 
over age 60 do not contribute. Government: does not 
contribute, save as employer. It gives loans to cover 
def i c i t s . There is a maximum for contributions and 
benefits. These contributions also finance payments 
for sickness, maternity and work accidents (except for 
self employed workers). 
Age 60 with 750 weeks of paid or accredited contribut-
ions. Minimum pension with 150 weeks paid (25 weeks 
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a c c r e d i t e d f o r every year over age 35 in i969; maximum 
accreditation: 600 weeks). Retirement not mandatory. 
Benefits: 40% of income, in accordance with 10 levels of wages in 
which the greatest number of contributions have been 
accredited. (Increased by 1% of income for every 50 
contributions over 750, up to a maximum of 60%). old 
age services: 1.3 times weekly wage, for every 50 
C contributions paid or accredited, i f ineligible for 
ç pension, but at least with 50 contributions prior to 
age 60. 
D.8) JAMAICA: 
Coverage: employees, including self employed workers and those 
voluntarily insured. Excluded are: occasional workers 
with wages below a minimum and non-remunerated family 
workers. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: Basic component, contributions set as a fixed 
amount, depending on which one of the following one i s : 
employees, self employed workers, military officers, 
domestic workers or voluntarily insured. Extra compon-
ent: set as percentage (2.5% for employees and 5% for 
self employed workers), over income between a set 
range. Employer: basic component, set as a fixed 
amount for employees and slightly lower for domestic 
workers. Extra component, 2.5% of nominal wage, for 
income placed within a set range. Government: con-
tributes as employer, plus administrative expenditures. 
These contributions also finance subsidies for mater-
nity and work accidents. 
Requirements : 
Age 65 men and 60 women, 156 weeks of paid contribut-
ions and a yearly average of 39 weeks paid or accredit-
ed. Pensions reduced for a yearly average of between 13 
and 38 weeks. Total amount granted i f between 52 and 
155 weeks of contributions have been paid. 
Benefits: Basic amount paid over which an amount i s added, r e l -
ated to contributions paid during working l i f e . Addit-
ional benefits per spouse. Old age subsidy: payments 
vary with the number of contributions for basic pen-
sions and number of contributions related to income. 
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D.9) SURINAM: 
Coverage: A l l wage earners and self employed workers not covered 
by special programmes. Special systems for public 
sector workers. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: 2% of income. Employer: does not contrib- 7 
ute. Government does not contribute. -, 
J 
Requirements : 
Age 60 and 10 years of contributions. ^ 
Benefits: Monthly allowance. 
D.IO) TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: 
Coverage: Social Insurance: wage earners between age 16 and 64, 
including agricultural and domestic workers, appren-
tices and public employees. Insurance voluntary for 
senior citizens and pensions for survivors. Social 
assistence: for residents with scarce resources. 
Source of 
Funds: Insured: approximately 2.8% of income, according to 8 
classes of wages. Voluntary insured persons, 5.6%. 
Employer: approximately 5.6% of nominal wage, accor-
ding to 8 levels of wages. Government: covers total 
cost of pensions for indigents. There i s a maximum 
income for contributions. 
Requirements: Age 60 with 750 weeks of paid or accredited cont-
ributions at the beginning of the system, in 1972, 
25 weeks of contributions were accredited to 
workers for each year over age 35, with a maximum 
of 600 weeks). Retirement mandatory at age 60-65. 
Pensions for the poor: age 65, with 20 years of 
residence and incomes below a set limit. 
Benefits: 25% to 75% of weekly income average (there i s a min-
imum), according to 8 levels of wages, plus 1% for 
every 25 weeks of contributions, over 750 weeks. 
Pensions for indigents: monthly allowance. Old age 
subsidies: 3 times the total of contributions paid by 
employer-employee, i f ineligible for pensions. There 
is minimum subsidy. 
